“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Genesis of the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Conmaand
Meanwhile, the American high command was struggling with the
more fundamental problems of antisubmarine policy. As has already
been noted in this volume and will be noticed repeatedly hereafter,
the question of shipping proved again and again the most crucial of
those faced in attempts to meet the demands of our hard pressed
forces in the Pacific and to provide for an early assumption of the
offensive against Germany. And so threatening to the basic strategy
agreed upon for the conduct of the war was the submarine attack
that no possibility of taking effective action against it could be over-
looked.
T w o things the submarine crisis had immediately made clear: an
effective antisubmarine campaign would require more aircraft than
could be supplied from current production designed for Navy use,
especially in view of the many demands on naval air strength; and
a large proportion of the necessary aircraft would have to consist
of land-based types, admittedly better suited, because of their speed,
range, and firepower, for antisubmarine attack than the seaplane.”
It was soon evident, too, that these requirements could be met either
by turning over to the Navy a force of Army land-based bombers
sufficient to allow that service to accomplish the task by itself, or by
setting up a separate command within the AAF to be specially trained
and equipped for antisubmarine warfare and with that as its sole
duty. Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became
almost a t once the subject of a jurisdictional controversy.
The issue first arose in acute form when the Navy acted early
in 1942 to secure a force of land-based bombers for its own use.
O n 1 5 January, the Air Staff had under consideration a request from
Rear Adm. John H. Towers, chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics,
for the transfer to the Navy from future production of Army-type
* O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The
experience of the last two winters has demonstrated that naval aviation missions such
as convoy escort, observation, scouting and patrolling over the sea, and the pro-
tection of shipping in the coastal zones, cannot be accomplished by seaplanes based
on ice-bound bases in the North Atlantic and Pacific areas. In addition to this ex-
perience, a study of the purely naval operations of the Coastal Command of the
Royal Air Force has led to the conviction that for such missions, carried out from
prepared fixed bases, multi-engined landplanes have certain characteristic advantages
in increased range, ease of maintenance, and facility of operation, over seaplanes.”
The Navy’s carrier-based planes which lent important weight to the antisubmarine
war in its later phase were not employed in the Atlantic until March 1943.
538