“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
in support of the naval forces of the Caribbean Sea Frontier, from
which headquarters they received their operational d i r e ~ t i o n . ~ ~
The U-boats had made their presence felt in the Caribbean on 16
February. Attacking with impunity, they sank several tankers off
Aruba on that date and even shelled an oil refinery on the island
itself.45By the end of September 1942, they had sunk 173 merchant
vessels in the western area of the Caribbean Sea Frontier. Shipping
losses reached their peak in August, with a total of thirty-three sinkings
in that area.46 The Caribbean, which offered an especially valu-
able opportunity in the oil and bauxite traffic between the CuraGao-
Aruba-Trinidad area and the continental United States, had thus
become a favorite hunting ground for the enemy raiders.
The forces available to the commander of the Caribbean Sea Fron-
tier, including those of the Antilles Air Task Force, were admittedly
insufficient during the early months of 1942 to provide effective
defense. Army bombardment forces available in February 1942 in-
cluded not more than forty operational B-18's in the medium bomber
class, plus about seven light bombers of the A-20 type. They in-
cluded no long-range planes a t all. These meager bombardment
forces, together with a few pursuit squadrons, were scattered about
the Caribbean in Trinidad, CuraGao, Aruba, St. Lucia, Surinam, British
Guiana, Puerto Rico, St. Croix, and Antigua. By the end of the
summer, the task force could count on few if any more bombers than
it had reported in February, although its strength in fighters had
more than d~ubled.~'The U.S. Navy meantime, however, had ma-
terially increased the scope and effectiveness of its effort in the
Caribbean, and although the Antilles Air Task Force had remained
in strength substantially as before, its units had acquired valuable
experience since February. Whereas prior to July they had executed
very few attacks, in July and August they reported more than a
score.48 During the fall of 1942, the U-boat command sharply re-
duced its activity in the Caribbean to concentrate its attention on
the North Atlantic convoy area and the approaches to Northwest
Africa.
Despite its almost exclusive preoccupation theretofore with sub-
marine warfare, the Antilles Air Task Force remained at the end of
1942 officially a striking force whose primary function was to guard
against possible attack on the Panama Canal. The prolonged presence
5 36