“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
damaging to the U-boat fleet.4oRather, aircraft made their contribu-
tion by forcing the enemy to submerge so frequently and to stay down
for such long intervals that their targets disappeared and their ac-
tivity became handicapped to the point where the returns barely
justified the expense.
According to postwar statements by Admiral Doenitz, the balance
sheet of profit and loss for activity in the western Atlantic favored
the submarine for a longer period than the U-boat command had
anticipated. The success of the first U-boats in American waters had
been, as expected, very considerable. American defenders were in-
experienced, whereas U-boat commanders had behind them more than
two years of operations. Every available submarine had, therefore,
been sent into the American zone. But it had been expected that the
resulting successes would soon fall off, and it was a matter of some
surprise to the Germans that until the end of September 1942 their
efforts remained profitable despite the long inoperative passage out
and back and despite the fact that the rapidly stiffening defenses off
the northeast coast had long since forced the U-boats to look farther
south for easy and economical v i c t ~ r i e s . ~ ~
Although driven from the home waters, and to a possibly decisive
extent by air power (Admiral Doenitz tells us that air reconnaissance
and attack was the antisubmarine measure most feared by the U-boat
command), the enemy had by no means been defeated. H e had
merely concentrated his efforts in other areas-and so effectively that
in November 1942,two months after he had virtually abandoned the
American home waters, he destroyed more Allied and neutral ship-
ping than in any month since June.42
While I Bomber Command was helping to drive the U-boats from
the home waters, and in the process was becoming an organization
especially trained and equipped for antisubmarine warfare, other
AAF units were also actively engaged against enemy submarines
in other parts of the western Atlantic. A few Army B-17’s, seldom
more than a squadron, continued during 1942 to supplement the
Navy’s air arm in the Newfoundland area.43But it was in the Carib-
bean that the Army units saw their most intensive and continuous
action. Units of the Caribbean Air Force, organized on I March 1942
into the Antilles Air Task Force in compliance with an order from
the parent organization dated I 6 February, devoted almost their
entire effort for the remainder of the year to antisubmarine operations
5 3 5