“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
by Army aircraft shows a rough correlation with the density of
U-boats in the coastal waters and with the rate of merchant vessel
sinkings. Since May the Germans had shifted the weight of their
effort steadily southward until, by September 1942,they had virtually
abandoned the Eastern and Gulf Sea frontiers. After 4 September,
no sinkings occurred in those waters as a result of enemy submarine
action during the remainder of the year. June 1942 had witnessed the
pattern of sinkings moving toward the Gulf and Caribbean areas. By
August, the Gulf was practically free of sinkings, which by that time
were heavily concentrated around Cuba and in the waters off Trini-
dad. By September, the enemy had given up attacks around Cuba,
Haiti, and Puerto Rico but continued in the Trinidad area, where
since February of 1942 a group of submarines had been consistently
successful in the vulnerable oil and bauxite shipping lanessB
This gradual withdrawal of the enemy reflects the steady increase
in both the weight and quality of the American antisubmarine effort.
That effort involved the operation of Navy and Army units, of
surface and air craft, and it would be futile to try to evaluate pre-
cisely the relative importance of any one factor. The coastwise con-
voy system, which the Navy was able to inaugurate in May, made it
possible for shipping to move in the American waters with greater
security, and it thereby did much to reduce the margin of profit the
U-boat command might expect from its activity in the western At-
lantic. But it is also true that this margin of profit was cut drastically
by the extension and increasing effectiveness of air patrol. In the
eastern Atlantic, the U-boat captains had demonstrated their unwill-
ingness to operate in areas systematically covered by aircraft, and it
appears that they continued to follow this policy in the western
Atlantic as well. Their decision, to be sure, did not result directly
from the damage sustained from attacks by American aircraft. In
the course of 59,248 operational hours flown between January and
October 1942, the I Bomber Command reported not many more than
200 sightings, in only eighty-one of which instances did attacks of
any sort ensue. These attacks resulted in the destruction of one
U-boat, the probably serious damage of six, and the less serious
damage of seven more. Attacks by naval aircraft occurred with in-
creasing frequency, amounting in all to well over half the total made
by aircraft during the period and in the area under review. But it is
still doubtful whether the total weight of air attack proved decisivdv
5 34