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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 40 …On recommendation of an American mission sent to Europe in June under newly commissioned Col. Raynal…
  • p. 50 …a r I1 and its self- conceived mission can be appreciated only in light of a…
  • p. 52 …In the lower grades, where promotion was controlled inexorably by seniority, Air Service pilots found themselves…
  • p. 56 …complete control of the Army and form an integral part thereof.” Yet the Crowell mission, appointed…
  • p. 60 …The Lampert Committee went far beyond its designated mission, bringing under review the whole province of…
  • p. 63 …to it a more or less independent mission. Experi- ence in World War I seemed to…
  • p. 65 …Command respon- sibility for that mission within the Air Corps devolved upon the Com- manding General…
  • p. 66 …Navy in further- awe of their respective missions. The Air Corps Tactical School claimed for air…
  • p. 69 …which fights for and gains control of the air,’’ and to calculate a well-balanced air…
  • p. 71 …Mitchell could still believe that “it was an established fact that the principal mission of an…
  • p. 80 …based on the fundamental doctrine that their mission is to aid the ground forces to gain…
  • p. 81 …The mission of the Army was defense of the United States and its outlying territories, but…
  • p. 129 …assigned to the air force an independent mission of strategic bombing. Accordingly, in March 1918 the…
  • p. 155 …By taking control of French or English colonial possessions, victorious Axis powers might lodge themselves at…
  • p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the US. Army and Navy…
  • p. 235 …Long-standing differences between the Army and Navy over jurisdictional control of offshore patrol had brought…
  • p. 241 …And because the chain of command in both Pacific areas and in Washington vested ultimate control…
  • p. 270 …Other combat activity by pursuit piiots was incidental to scheduled reconnaissance missions, as when on I…
  • p. 273 …Atlantic and India,” would come under his control at Bangal~re.’~ It soon became evident, however…
  • p. 295 …American forces in Burma, and later in India, had as a primary mission the promotion of…
  • p. 306 …The mission of the MAB was to keep current estimates of U.S.-British munitions resources…
  • p. 308 …of a “nucleus of GHQ.” Its original mission was to direct the training of the tactical…
  • p. 314 …The field forces remained under the control of the General Staff, and the War Plans Division…
  • p. 316 …General Arnold’s control of the US. Air Force is as com- plete, virtually, as is…
  • p. 317 …it also made possible a certain indirect control from Washington through letters written more often in…
  • p. 343 …To permit effective control of fighter planes at night or during bad weather would have required…
  • p. 368 …constituted as of 29 May.’l The mission of the new command was, first, “to move…
  • p. 379 …A North African military mission under Brig. Gen. Russell H. Maxwell had been established at Cairo…
  • p. 397 …In helping to prepare HALPRO for overseas movement by air and in controlling the flight along…
  • p. 412 …to perform a series of remarkable special missions. Shuttling between Australia, the Philippines, the Nether- lands…
  • p. 426 …formation of task forces to undertake specific missions, and for their command he was to designate…
  • p. 441 …But of these, four missions involving a total of seventeen bombers were abortive because of un…
  • p. 458 …During January and February the bomber command dispatched approxi- mately sixty heavy bomber missions, for a…
  • p. 464 …attempting a take-off for yet another mission of relief.’ If the Americans on Bataan and…
  • p. 472 …naval control, during which time six of the planes flew the first American bomber mission against…
  • p. 475 …Such missions, however, could be flown only with the greatest expenditure of time and effort. Until…
  • p. 500 …remain in the Far East under the control of General S t i l ~ e l…
  • p. 503 …But circumstances beyond the control of the aircrews were against the flight. Although a fortuitous and…
  • p. 525 …of Midway, nor had it retained operational control of the few planes actually sent up to…
  • p. 527 …If the vulnerable PBY's were shot down while executing their search mission, this was a…
  • p. 549 …those who had flown their first combat mission in April had to fight a feeling of…
  • p. 571 …largest mission to date comprised a total of six bombers- would remain under theater control but…
  • p. 589 …This, the Army felt, might lead ultimately to Navy control of all air forces. As late…
  • p. 620 …At the same time, it initiated projects peculiar to its own mission and by the end…
  • p. 621 …It would work in conjunction with naval forces and under their operational control “wherever this may…
  • p. 646 …the British Joint Staff Mission a t Washington, the American Military Mission at London.” The American…
  • p. 647 …General Chaney opened his headquarters in the American Embassy building on 19 May 1941.'' His mission…
  • p. 648 …Air forces would have two missions: to pro- vide, in certain areas, an “air defense, integrated…
  • p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation with the RAF, of attacking…
  • p. 651 …Military Mission in London-under direct control of the commanding general of U S . Field Forces…
  • p. 654 …They consider that function their primary mission here and are not willing to surrender it.1le…
  • p. 659 …bombardment missions, either by direct coverage or by synchronized fighter sweeps. Strategic control of AAF operations…
  • p. 669 …o n ~ . ~ ’ ~Such operations under the RAF control system required numerous modifications for the plane-about…
  • p. 683 …not be adequate to carry out the mission intended for it under GYM- NAST. H e…
  • p. 684 …T o adapt the Eighth Air Force to its new mission required a con- siderable reshuffling…
  • p. 717 …develop- ment of adequate machinery for the control of combat operations by establishing the Provisional I…
  • p. 728 …2 , 27 AUGUST 2942 HE Eighth Air Force flew its first mission in an atmosphere charged…
  • p. 730 …in preparation for initial operations under RAF control. Each of the three squadrons was attached for…
  • p. 731 …Policy concerning the pro- vision and control of fighter escort had not yet been determined, but…
  • p. 735 …Shortly before 1900 hours, watchers on the control tower spotted a cluster of specks to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
by Army aircraft shows a rough correlation with the density of
U-boats in the coastal waters and with the rate of merchant vessel
sinkings. Since May the Germans had shifted the weight of their
effort steadily southward until, by September 1942,they had virtually
abandoned the Eastern and Gulf Sea frontiers. After 4 September,
no sinkings occurred in those waters as a result of enemy submarine
action during the remainder of the year. June 1942 had witnessed the
pattern of sinkings moving toward the Gulf and Caribbean areas. By
August, the Gulf was practically free of sinkings, which by that time
were heavily concentrated around Cuba and in the waters off Trini-
dad. By September, the enemy had given up attacks around Cuba,
Haiti, and Puerto Rico but continued in the Trinidad area, where
since February of 1942 a group of submarines had been consistently
successful in the vulnerable oil and bauxite shipping lanessB
This gradual withdrawal of the enemy reflects the steady increase
in both the weight and quality of the American antisubmarine effort.
That effort involved the operation of Navy and Army units, of
surface and air craft, and it would be futile to try to evaluate pre-
cisely the relative importance of any one factor. The coastwise con-
voy system, which the Navy was able to inaugurate in May, made it
possible for shipping to move in the American waters with greater
security, and it thereby did much to reduce the margin of profit the
U-boat command might expect from its activity in the western At-
lantic. But it is also true that this margin of profit was cut drastically
by the extension and increasing effectiveness of air patrol. In the
eastern Atlantic, the U-boat captains had demonstrated their unwill-
ingness to operate in areas systematically covered by aircraft, and it
appears that they continued to follow this policy in the western
Atlantic as well. Their decision, to be sure, did not result directly
from the damage sustained from attacks by American aircraft. In
the course of 59,248 operational hours flown between January and
October 1942, the I Bomber Command reported not many more than
200 sightings, in only eighty-one of which instances did attacks of
any sort ensue. These attacks resulted in the destruction of one
U-boat, the probably serious damage of six, and the less serious
damage of seven more. Attacks by naval aircraft occurred with in-
creasing frequency, amounting in all to well over half the total made
by aircraft during the period and in the area under review. But it is
still doubtful whether the total weight of air attack proved decisivdv
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.