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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
radar had opened up an entirely new field for investigation in anti-
submarine tactics, though as yet little had been done in this coun-
try along that line and only a few Army aircraft were specially
equipped.34
Generally speaking, Army antisubmarine operations fell into three
broad categories: routine patrol of areas in which the threat of enemy
action existed, special patrol of an area in which a particular U-boat
was known to be lurking (a process known sometimes as a “killer
hunt” and carried out often in conjunction with naval air and surface
forces), and cover for convoys sailing within range of land-based
aircraft. The first two of these activities, involving as they did an
attempt to search out and attack the enemy, constituted the offensive
phase of the campaign. The last, consisting of the direct protection of
shipping, was primarily defensive in character, although it was recog-
nized that the vicinity of a convoy was a likely place for U-boats to
be It was not, however, until after 15 May 1942 that the
Army units were called upon for regular convoy cover, for it was
not until that date that the Navy felt able, in terms of escort vessels
and aircraft, to inaugurate a convoy system for coastal shipping.36
Beginning in May, I Bomber Command aircraft were requested by
the sea frontier commanders to take part in the protection of convoys
from Key West to the Chesapeake Bay, and during the summer steps
were taken to extend protection to the oil and bauxite shipping in the
Caribbean. The Navy was able to assume a large share of this convoy
air cover. By the end of May, it was employing long-range PBY-
type aircraft with an endurance of fifteen hours over the most distant
convoy route~.~’Nevertheless, convoy protection was already com-
peting strongly for the services of AAF antisubmarine units.
Six months of experience in U-boat hunting began to bear fruit
during July, August, and September in a noticeably higher level of
success in the attacks made by units operating under I Bomber Com-
mand control. Although the number of attacks fell off rapidly after
the high record of June, the proportion of those considered damaging
to the submarine increased remarkably. Whereas during the previous
three months only seven of the fifty-four attacks were thus assessed,
during July, August, and September eight out of twenty-four attacks
were believed to have damaged the enemy craft, and one, executed on
7 July, resulted in a sure “kill.” 3 8
Still more interesting is the fact that the frequency of attacks made
533

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