“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
radar had opened up an entirely new field for investigation in anti-
submarine tactics, though as yet little had been done in this coun-
try along that line and only a few Army aircraft were specially
equipped.34
Generally speaking, Army antisubmarine operations fell into three
broad categories: routine patrol of areas in which the threat of enemy
action existed, special patrol of an area in which a particular U-boat
was known to be lurking (a process known sometimes as a “killer
hunt” and carried out often in conjunction with naval air and surface
forces), and cover for convoys sailing within range of land-based
aircraft. The first two of these activities, involving as they did an
attempt to search out and attack the enemy, constituted the offensive
phase of the campaign. The last, consisting of the direct protection of
shipping, was primarily defensive in character, although it was recog-
nized that the vicinity of a convoy was a likely place for U-boats to
be It was not, however, until after 15 May 1942 that the
Army units were called upon for regular convoy cover, for it was
not until that date that the Navy felt able, in terms of escort vessels
and aircraft, to inaugurate a convoy system for coastal shipping.36
Beginning in May, I Bomber Command aircraft were requested by
the sea frontier commanders to take part in the protection of convoys
from Key West to the Chesapeake Bay, and during the summer steps
were taken to extend protection to the oil and bauxite shipping in the
Caribbean. The Navy was able to assume a large share of this convoy
air cover. By the end of May, it was employing long-range PBY-
type aircraft with an endurance of fifteen hours over the most distant
convoy route~.~’Nevertheless, convoy protection was already com-
peting strongly for the services of AAF antisubmarine units.
Six months of experience in U-boat hunting began to bear fruit
during July, August, and September in a noticeably higher level of
success in the attacks made by units operating under I Bomber Com-
mand control. Although the number of attacks fell off rapidly after
the high record of June, the proportion of those considered damaging
to the submarine increased remarkably. Whereas during the previous
three months only seven of the fifty-four attacks were thus assessed,
during July, August, and September eight out of twenty-four attacks
were believed to have damaged the enemy craft, and one, executed on
7 July, resulted in a sure “kill.” 3 8
Still more interesting is the fact that the frequency of attacks made
533