“United Press”36 pages
- p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8
LONDON
The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada
Copyright 1948 by…
- p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary
judgment of the importance of this…
- p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani-
zation and, by default, leadership…
- p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing
for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
- p. 61 …It held that
there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
- p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures,
and Howell’s group…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States
and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
- p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could
be concentrated on either coast…
- p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval
air units, while the army attempted to…
- p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train-
ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
- p. 164 …A m y air units in the
Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
- p. 176 …no military alliances
were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans
only…
- p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy
bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
- p. 285 …From 1938 the United
States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
- p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and
lmmediate Deployment
On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
- p. 289 …ground units sent
in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major
invasion of…
- p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States.
Capture of…
- p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them-
selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
- p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart-
ment again pressed for an answer…
- p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle
East Air Force and later as…
- p. 430 …Attempts had been
made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United
States, but…
- p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no
opportunity to get set. The…
- p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters
already included many representatives of the…
- p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the
Netherlands East Indies, he was…
- p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved
that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed
trucks…
- p. 563 …Grady arrived from the
United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with
reference to…
- p. 564 …TO C H I N A
graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to
make high…
- p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became
almost a t once…
- p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate
offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily
against…
- p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air
units initially based there were to…
- p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United
Kingdom several months…
- p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with
its own under a plan eventually…
- p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was
(Patrick, United States in the Air, pp.
190-91.)
38. Charges of…
- p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941.
9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a.
92…
- p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45
Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
tribution to victory, but also because of its importance in establish-
ing the United States Air Force as a military service independent
of the Army. The huge investment of men and machines and the
effectiveness of the combined Anglo-American bomber offensive
against Germany had not been subjected to the critical scrutiny
they have since received. Nor, given the personalities involved and
the immediacy of the events, did the authors question some of the
command arrangements. In the tactical area, to give another
example, the authors did not doubt the effect of aerial interdiction
on both the German withdrawal from Sicily and the allied land-
ings at Anzio.
Editors Craven and Gate insisted that the volumes present the
war through the eyes of the major commanders, and be based on
information available to them as important decisions were made.
At the time, secrecy still shrouded the Allied code-breaking effort.
While the link between decoded message traffic and combat action
occasionally emerges from these pages, the authors lacked the
knowledge to portray adequately the intelligence aspects of many
operations, such as the interdiction in 1943 of Axis supply lines
to Tunisia and the systematic bombardment, beginning in 1944,
of the German oil industry.
All historical works a generation old suffer such limitations.
New information and altered perspective inevitably change the
emphasis of an historical account. Some accounts in these volumes
have been superseded by subsequent research and other portions
will be superseded in the future. However, these books met the
highest of contemporary professional standards of quality and
comprehensiveness. They contain information and experience
that are of great value to the Air Force today and to the public.
Together they are the only comprehensive discussion of Army Air
Forces activity in the largest air war this nation has ever waged.
Until we summon the resources to take a fresh, comprehensive
look at the Army Air Forces’ experience in World War 11, these
seven volumes will continue to serve us as well for the next quarter
century as they have for the last.
R I C H A R D H . KOHN
Chief, Ofice of Air Force History
vi