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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E B A T T L R O F T H E A T L A N T I C
MacDill Field, Florida, at the disposal of the Gulf Task Force. A plan
embodying these recommendations was put into effect on I July 1942.
In addition, two observation groups (the 128th and the 124th) were
attached to the Gulf Task Force in early July primarily for the pur-
pose of forming and training Civil Air Patrol groups in the Gulf area.
Meanwhile, arrangements had been made to establish a joint opera-
tions center a t Miami, to be built on the general pattern being evolved
for similar purposes in New York City. The project was initiated in
June. By September, the I Bomber Command was operating from ten
bases scattered along the coast line from Westover Field, Massa-
chusetts, to Galveston, Texas."
During April, May, and June of 1942, I Bomber Command planes,
and those serving under the operational direction of that command,
attacked enemy submarines at a steadily increasing rate. Although
hours flown during this period showed a slight decrease in monthly
total from the record activity registered in March, the number of
attacks for the three-month period turned out to be almost seven
times greater than for the first three months of the year. And of the
fifty-four attacks recorded, a t least seven appear to have resulted in
some damage to the enemy craft. As yet, however, no attack had
resulted in the destruction of a U-boat. Nonetheless, the total harass-
ing effect seems to have been considerable, as is suggested by the
enemy's tendency to shift the attack to the areas less effectively
covered by air patr01.~'
More promising was the tactical experience gained in the course of
those first six months of continuous operations. It was necessarily a
period of training and experimentation, and the later effectiveness of
the Army antisubmarine campaign depended to a large extent on the
experience gained from January to July of 1942. Fortunately, both
Army and Navy antisubmarine forces were able to draw largely on
the experience of the British for their initial stock of tactical data,
and they made extensive use of their opportunity. Of particular aid
to the AAF units was the help given by two liaison officers sent to the
United States in February.'l
Study of British intelligence data indicated that, prior to August
1941, British aircraft had executed 2 7 0 attacks on U-boats, as a result
of which two U-boats had been definitely sunk and five more prob-
ably sunk. On the basis of this experience, not wholly encouraging
in the sum total, British analysts had been able to arrive at certain very
5 3 '

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