“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E B A T T L R O F T H E A T L A N T I C
MacDill Field, Florida, at the disposal of the Gulf Task Force. A plan
embodying these recommendations was put into effect on I July 1942.
In addition, two observation groups (the 128th and the 124th) were
attached to the Gulf Task Force in early July primarily for the pur-
pose of forming and training Civil Air Patrol groups in the Gulf area.
Meanwhile, arrangements had been made to establish a joint opera-
tions center a t Miami, to be built on the general pattern being evolved
for similar purposes in New York City. The project was initiated in
June. By September, the I Bomber Command was operating from ten
bases scattered along the coast line from Westover Field, Massa-
chusetts, to Galveston, Texas."
During April, May, and June of 1942, I Bomber Command planes,
and those serving under the operational direction of that command,
attacked enemy submarines at a steadily increasing rate. Although
hours flown during this period showed a slight decrease in monthly
total from the record activity registered in March, the number of
attacks for the three-month period turned out to be almost seven
times greater than for the first three months of the year. And of the
fifty-four attacks recorded, a t least seven appear to have resulted in
some damage to the enemy craft. As yet, however, no attack had
resulted in the destruction of a U-boat. Nonetheless, the total harass-
ing effect seems to have been considerable, as is suggested by the
enemy's tendency to shift the attack to the areas less effectively
covered by air patr01.~'
More promising was the tactical experience gained in the course of
those first six months of continuous operations. It was necessarily a
period of training and experimentation, and the later effectiveness of
the Army antisubmarine campaign depended to a large extent on the
experience gained from January to July of 1942. Fortunately, both
Army and Navy antisubmarine forces were able to draw largely on
the experience of the British for their initial stock of tactical data,
and they made extensive use of their opportunity. Of particular aid
to the AAF units was the help given by two liaison officers sent to the
United States in February.'l
Study of British intelligence data indicated that, prior to August
1941, British aircraft had executed 2 7 0 attacks on U-boats, as a result
of which two U-boats had been definitely sunk and five more prob-
ably sunk. On the basis of this experience, not wholly encouraging
in the sum total, British analysts had been able to arrive at certain very
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