The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E B A T T L R O F T H E A T L A N T I C
MacDill Field, Florida, at the disposal of the Gulf Task Force. A plan
embodying these recommendations was put into effect on I July 1942.
In addition, two observation groups (the 128th and the 124th) were
attached to the Gulf Task Force in early July primarily for the pur-
pose of forming and training Civil Air Patrol groups in the Gulf area.
Meanwhile, arrangements had been made to establish a joint opera-
tions center a t Miami, to be built on the general pattern being evolved
for similar purposes in New York City. The project was initiated in
June. By September, the I Bomber Command was operating from ten
bases scattered along the coast line from Westover Field, Massa-
chusetts, to Galveston, Texas."
During April, May, and June of 1942, I Bomber Command planes,
and those serving under the operational direction of that command,
attacked enemy submarines at a steadily increasing rate. Although
hours flown during this period showed a slight decrease in monthly
total from the record activity registered in March, the number of
attacks for the three-month period turned out to be almost seven
times greater than for the first three months of the year. And of the
fifty-four attacks recorded, a t least seven appear to have resulted in
some damage to the enemy craft. As yet, however, no attack had
resulted in the destruction of a U-boat. Nonetheless, the total harass-
ing effect seems to have been considerable, as is suggested by the
enemy's tendency to shift the attack to the areas less effectively
covered by air patr01.~'
More promising was the tactical experience gained in the course of
those first six months of continuous operations. It was necessarily a
period of training and experimentation, and the later effectiveness of
the Army antisubmarine campaign depended to a large extent on the
experience gained from January to July of 1942. Fortunately, both
Army and Navy antisubmarine forces were able to draw largely on
the experience of the British for their initial stock of tactical data,
and they made extensive use of their opportunity. Of particular aid
to the AAF units was the help given by two liaison officers sent to the
United States in February.'l
Study of British intelligence data indicated that, prior to August
1941, British aircraft had executed 2 7 0 attacks on U-boats, as a result
of which two U-boats had been definitely sunk and five more prob-
ably sunk. On the basis of this experience, not wholly encouraging
in the sum total, British analysts had been able to arrive at certain very
5 3 '