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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ranging from light single-engine to twin-engine types, as yet carried
no bombs, and for the most part were unable to fly patrols of any
great distance; but they managed nevertheless to relieve the Army
units, especially those of the I Air Support Command, of some of the
routine reconnaissance flying. They operated under the guidance of
that command, which in turn served under the operational control
of the I Bomber Command.’*
O n 26 March 1942, an agreement was reached between the Army
and Navy which clarified for the time being the relationship of both
these Army air commands to the naval command. Heretofore the
Army units had been operating under the control of the commander
of the Eastern Sea Frontier, but the system rested on grounds out-
lined only very generally in Joint Action and of recent months ren-
dered soft and untrustworthy by prolonged debate. There had even
been talk of “mutual cooperation” rather than “unity of command.”
Some firm decision on the matter was therefore essential to efficient
joint operations. It finally came in a message sent by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the commanding generals of all defense commands which
unequivocally vested jurisdiction in the sea frontier commanders over
naval forces allocated thereto and all Army air units engaged in opera-
tions over the sea for the protection of shipping and against enemy
seaborne activities. Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, commanding general of
the Eastern Defense Command, promptly made available to the com-
mander of the Eastern Sea Frontier all units of I Bomber Command,
I Air Support Command, and the Civil Air Patrol, with the exception
of three bombardment and four observation squadrons which were
held as operational training units for the training of personnel in sea
search.*‘
Generally speaking, the problem facing the AAF antisubmarine
force had by the end of March assumed a more or less distinct outline.
The I Bomber Command had made progress toward adjustment to
the tactical situation into which it had been so suddenly thrust, but
Brig. Gen. Westside T. Larson, who on 7 March had succeeded Gem
era1 Krogstad in command of the organization, was able to point out
several impediments remaining in its path. Shortages in personnel and
equipment, ineffective telephone and radio communication systems, a
joint control room that, despite efforts made to improve it, still
proved unsatisfactory-these were some of the difficulties he saw still
to be overcome. In addition, he pointed urgently to the need for
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.