The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
ranging from light single-engine to twin-engine types, as yet carried
no bombs, and for the most part were unable to fly patrols of any
great distance; but they managed nevertheless to relieve the Army
units, especially those of the I Air Support Command, of some of the
routine reconnaissance flying. They operated under the guidance of
that command, which in turn served under the operational control
of the I Bomber Command.’*
O n 26 March 1942, an agreement was reached between the Army
and Navy which clarified for the time being the relationship of both
these Army air commands to the naval command. Heretofore the
Army units had been operating under the control of the commander
of the Eastern Sea Frontier, but the system rested on grounds out-
lined only very generally in Joint Action and of recent months ren-
dered soft and untrustworthy by prolonged debate. There had even
been talk of “mutual cooperation” rather than “unity of command.”
Some firm decision on the matter was therefore essential to efficient
joint operations. It finally came in a message sent by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the commanding generals of all defense commands which
unequivocally vested jurisdiction in the sea frontier commanders over
naval forces allocated thereto and all Army air units engaged in opera-
tions over the sea for the protection of shipping and against enemy
seaborne activities. Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, commanding general of
the Eastern Defense Command, promptly made available to the com-
mander of the Eastern Sea Frontier all units of I Bomber Command,
I Air Support Command, and the Civil Air Patrol, with the exception
of three bombardment and four observation squadrons which were
held as operational training units for the training of personnel in sea
search.*‘
Generally speaking, the problem facing the AAF antisubmarine
force had by the end of March assumed a more or less distinct outline.
The I Bomber Command had made progress toward adjustment to
the tactical situation into which it had been so suddenly thrust, but
Brig. Gen. Westside T. Larson, who on 7 March had succeeded Gem
era1 Krogstad in command of the organization, was able to point out
several impediments remaining in its path. Shortages in personnel and
equipment, ineffective telephone and radio communication systems, a
joint control room that, despite efforts made to improve it, still
proved unsatisfactory-these were some of the difficulties he saw still
to be overcome. In addition, he pointed urgently to the need for
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