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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
servation Group of the I Air Support Command with a few B-18's
was placed under the operational control of this office in order to
reinforce naval patrol in that area.2o
It soon became evident that successful warfare against U-boats
demanded improved methods of joint control so that both air and
surface forces might proceed to the scene of a U-boat sighting with
the least possible delay. Here the British were able to offer valuable
advice based on the already considerable experience gained by R A F
Coastal Command in joint operations with the Royal Navy. With the
help of R A F officers sent to America at the request of the Assistant
Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence for the purpose of giving aid and
counsel to the new antisubmarine force, steps were taken to make the
joint control room in N e w York City truly a nerve center for joint
action.'l
Naturally enough, this extreme activity on shore was not at once
reflected in correspondingly improved operations at sea. Handicaps
involving training and equipment could not be overcome immedi-
ately. In fact, the German submarines ran little risk from aerial attack
during January and February of I 942. Although operational hours
flown by Army planes in the Eastern Sea Frontier amounted to
almost 8,000, only four attacks were made, none of which appears to
have resulted in damage to the target. By the end of March the situa-
tion had improved perceptibly. T h e U-boats, it is true, continued in
steadily increasing numbers to exact a mounting toll of merchant
shipping. But they also were meeting rapidly stiffening opposition.
I Bomber Command planes flew almost as many hours in March as
they had in the previous two months put together." They still made
relatively few attacks, and those they made left much to be desired.
Yet this expanded air patrol, by forcing the enemy craft to remain
submerged for increasing lengths of time, curtailed the freedom with
which they had operated hitherto. It is also worth noticing that a few
Army planes (four to be exact) had begun to carry radar equipment.
More rapid increase in the use of this critically important equipment
was prevented by a shortage both of new sets and of spare parts for
the few old ones available. And much work remained to be done
before the potentialities of radar for antisubmarine purposes could be
reali~ed.'~
In March, too, the Civil Air Patrol began offshore flights with the
aircraft of its newly created Coastal Patrol. These civilian aircraft,
5 2 7

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.