“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R 11
manded combat planes.* Little wonder that General Arnold, faced
with the problem of parceling out inadequate resources, was able to
make available for antisubmarine operations only limited forces.
Early Antisubmarine Operations
Within the limits imposed by the general emergency, the opera-
tional record of those AAF units-principally of the I Bomber Com-
mand-which participated in the antisubmarine war was on the whole
very creditable. Life in the I Bomber Command moved a t a hectic
pace during the early months of war. The entire command had to be
reorganized. Having been relieved during December and January of
all but one of its bombardment groups (the 2d), it had in the first
two months of 1942 to assimilate two new bombardment groups (the
45th and the 13th) and two reconnaissance squadrons (the 3d and
92d).ls These units were for the most part as yet untrained even in
the normal techniques of bombardment, to say nothing of the special
tactics of antisubmarine warfare. Thus the command was faced with
the double problem of reorienting the training of its units and adapt-
ing all its equipment to meet the requirements of its enlarged mission.
Moreover, most of the new techniques had to be learned through
actual experience; and, owing to the urgent need for antisubmarine
patrols, the air units were forced to accomplish their training in the
course of operational missions.1g
Though even more understaffed than most organizations in those
days, I Bomber Command headquarters, under the command of Brig.
Gen. A.N. Krogstad, attacked these complex tasks with resourceful-
ness and vigor. On I 2 December, General Krogstad set up an advance
echelon at New York City to conduct tactical operations in conjunc-
tion with the NANCF, and this detachment was followed shortly by
the entire headquarters staff. On 24 January the system of joint de-
fense was extended by the establishment of a liaison office with the
Sixth Naval District at Charleston, South Carolina. The 66th Ob-
* As evidence of a continuing difficulty in reconciling the demand and the supply
of equipment, it may be further noted that the emergency call from the Middle East
in June was met by diversion of the Halverson detachment and the transfer of
virtually all heavy bombers from India, that the 43d Bombardment Group (H)
which had reached Australia in March did not receive its planes until September,
that the Eighth Air Force began operations with only one heavy bomber group, and
that the subsequent requirements of the North African operation served to keep the
combat strength of the Eighth in heavy bombers at no more than six groups until
May '943.
5 26