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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C medium range only, and were relatively limited in their carrying capacity. And all as yet lacked special detection equipment.17 This, then, was the status of the air defenses which the United States could bring to bear against the enemy at the opening of a most critical phase of that costly and crucial battle of Atlantic shipping and supply. It was an inadequate effort, albeit the best that could be mounted in the existing circumstances. T h e explanation lies partly in the general state of American military preparedness existing prior to December 1941.T h e emergency in the eastern coastal waters was in a sense but one of several desperate situations which, taken together, stretched the resources of the U.S. armed forces in those dark days almost to the breaking point. But the weakness of the antisubmarine forces can be explained only in part by mere lack of men and equip- ment. It must be explained also in terms of a lack of the right kinds of equipment and of properly trained men-which, in turn, points unavoidably to faulty planning in the field of coastal defense during the years before the war. But the opportunities of those years were now gone. T h e imme- diate question was what steps in addition to the first emergency meas- ures should be taken to cope with the submarine attack. That question resolved itself into two parts: ( I ) what defenses could be provided on a continuing emergency basis; and ( 2 ) what systematic approach could be made to the entire problem. In considering the contribution that could be made by the AAF to the solution of the initial problem, it must be borne in mind that there were many calls for planes but few planes in these first days of the war. At the very outset, reinforcement of the Philippines had been given the highest priority, and only by repossession of LB-3o’s from the British had it been possible to get out to the Netherlands East Indies the meager force which after sustaining heavy losses fell back on Australia. T h e demands of Australian defense itself outstripped the equipment salvaged from the Java operations. It had been neces- sary to send help to Hawaii. Growing concern for the security of the South Pacific, of Alaska, and of the Panama Canal prompted addi- tional demands. T h e requirements of air transport placed still another premium on the very planes which because of their range were best suited to antisubmarine patrol. Nor was it possible while meeting these emergency calls to overlook the urgent requirements of an expanding training program which at the level of unit training de- 525
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