Documents / Document
This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R 11 units best equipped for antisubmarine operations trained almost ex- clusively in the performance of their primary function of bombard- ment rather than in a secondary, emergency duty of antisubmarine p a t r ~ l . ~ More serious was the inability of the Navy to meet a crisis falling in an area of primary responsibility. Whether because of its tradi- tional concern for the problems of the Pacific or for other reasons, the crisis of December 1941 found the Navy unable to perform the offshore patrol necessary in order to cope effectively with the subma- rines. T h e commander of the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier (in February 1942 replaced by Eastern Sea Frontier), on whom fell the immediate responsibility for countering the submarine menace, reported that he had at his disposal on 2 2 December 1941,after other demands on his resources had been met, a force of some twenty sur- face vessels capable of taking limited action against submarines. This force he regarded as woefully inadequate for its task, since there was “not a vessel available that an enemy submarine could not outdistance when operating on the surface.” “In most cases,” he added, “the guns of these vessels would be outranged by those of the submarine.”” Nor was it possible to augment these forces to any appreciable extent before May 1942. Repeated and urgent requests for destroyers and escort vessels were denied by COMINCH on the ground that equally imperative needs existed elsewhere.” This inadequacy of surface forces naturally threw a heavier immediate burden upon available air resources, but strength in naval aircraft at hand for antisubniarine patrol proved equally insufficient. Of approximately IOO planes at the disposal of the N A N C F commander on the outbreak of war, the great majority were trainers, scouts, or transport types, unsuited for the task at hand. By the end of January the situation had improved slightly, though not in the category of long-range patrol. “There are,” the N A N C F commander reported to COMINCH on 14 Jan- uary 1942, “no effective planes attached to the Frontier. . .capable of maintaining long-range seaward patrols.” In reply to his urgent re- quest for at least one squadron of patrol planes, he was told that additional allocations depended on future production.12 Here, as else- where in these early days of 1942, the demands made upon all services for men and equipment were great but the supply small. So it was that the burden of antisubmarine patrol fell heavily on 522
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.