The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
had easily disposed of a surfaced U-boat, Mitchell’s First Provisional
Air Brigade, hastily assembled and trained at Langley Field, attacked
and sank three German ships-a destroyer, the cruiser Frankfurt, and
the heavily compartmented battleship Ostfrieslmd. Disputes arose as
to the manner in which the experiment-directed by the Navy-had
been conducted, and the Joint Board’s report tended to deprecate the
effectiveness of aerial b~mbing.’~But the fact of the sinkings was in-
disputable, and Mitchell went on to clinch the validity of his claims
by tests conducted with like results on obsolete U.S. battleships-the
Alabama in September 192I and the Virginia and New Jersey in Sep-
tember 1923.’~
Renewed congressional interest in the independent air force stimu-
lated by the Ostfriesland test was unproductive in the face of opposi-
tion in both houses and from President Harding.” The annual reports
of the Chief of the Air Service indicated, however, the need of some
immediate action to prevent the virtual extinction of the air arm.
Equipment, largely of wartime vintage, was obsolescent and unsafe,
with personnel far below authorized strength. On 3 0 June 1921 the
Air Service numbered but 975 officers and 1 7 5 flying cadets; a year
later the officer roster had shrunk to 952, enlisted strength to 8,936.28
With only one group each of pursuit, attack, and bombardment avia-
t i ~ n , ’ ~the Air Service as a combatant arm was practically demobilized.
Cautious in his policies, Patrick was then no public advocate of the
separate department for air; he did plead for more liberal support of
aeronautics and for recognition of the sharp functional distinction
between auxiliary units for the Army (“air service,” ideally 2 0 per
cent of the total air strength) and offensive aviation (“air force,”
ideally 80 per cent), which needed a different type of command struc-
In response to definite recommendations made by Patrick, the
General Staff in March 1923 appointed its own board to examine the
status of the Air Service. In spite of its constituency, the Lassiter Board
confirmed Patrick’s dismal appraisal. Stating that air operations were
“now recognized as being as important as the tactics of the ground
and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion program
with increased and regular appropriations and the acceptance of
Patrick’s idea of massing the bulk of offensive aviation into a striking
force under GHQ.31The Lassiter report was approved by the Sec-
retary of War, but, when naval members of the Joint Board opposed
it, he made no attempt to secure the enabling legi~lation.~~
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