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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 had easily disposed of a surfaced U-boat, Mitchell’s First Provisional Air Brigade, hastily assembled and trained at Langley Field, attacked and sank three German ships-a destroyer, the cruiser Frankfurt, and the heavily compartmented battleship Ostfrieslmd. Disputes arose as to the manner in which the experiment-directed by the Navy-had been conducted, and the Joint Board’s report tended to deprecate the effectiveness of aerial b~mbing.’~But the fact of the sinkings was in- disputable, and Mitchell went on to clinch the validity of his claims by tests conducted with like results on obsolete U.S. battleships-the Alabama in September 192I and the Virginia and New Jersey in Sep- tember 1923.’~ Renewed congressional interest in the independent air force stimu- lated by the Ostfriesland test was unproductive in the face of opposi- tion in both houses and from President Harding.” The annual reports of the Chief of the Air Service indicated, however, the need of some immediate action to prevent the virtual extinction of the air arm. Equipment, largely of wartime vintage, was obsolescent and unsafe, with personnel far below authorized strength. On 3 0 June 1921 the Air Service numbered but 975 officers and 1 7 5 flying cadets; a year later the officer roster had shrunk to 952, enlisted strength to 8,936.28 With only one group each of pursuit, attack, and bombardment avia- t i ~ n , ’ ~the Air Service as a combatant arm was practically demobilized. Cautious in his policies, Patrick was then no public advocate of the separate department for air; he did plead for more liberal support of aeronautics and for recognition of the sharp functional distinction between auxiliary units for the Army (“air service,” ideally 2 0 per cent of the total air strength) and offensive aviation (“air force,” ideally 80 per cent), which needed a different type of command struc- In response to definite recommendations made by Patrick, the General Staff in March 1923 appointed its own board to examine the status of the Air Service. In spite of its constituency, the Lassiter Board confirmed Patrick’s dismal appraisal. Stating that air operations were “now recognized as being as important as the tactics of the ground and sea forces,” the board recommended a ten-year expansion program with increased and regular appropriations and the acceptance of Patrick’s idea of massing the bulk of offensive aviation into a striking force under GHQ.31The Lassiter report was approved by the Sec- retary of War, but, when naval members of the Joint Board opposed it, he made no attempt to secure the enabling legi~lation.~~ 26
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