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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C land-based bombers might well be the principal arm employed. Furthermore, since most situations in which the Navy would be called upon for coastal defense operations would be ones in which the GHQ Air Force would also be involved as a striking force, the Navy would, according to its own argument, gain control of Army air forces in any tactical situation then considered likely to develop. This, the Army felt, might lead ultimately to Navy control of all air forces. As late as December 1941the problem was still under debate; but unity of command in defense of the eastern coast, as far as joint air action was concerned, for practical purposes was vested in the commander of the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier (NANCF) .* The Navy, then, at the outbreak of war was responsible for the protection of coastwise shipping and for the conduct of offshore patrol. In other words, the responsibility for the development of anti- submarine defenses lay with the Navy. The Army air arm, on the other hand, was obliged to act in support of or in lieu of naval forces should it be called upon to do so, that is to say, it had an emergency responsibility. In addition, Joint Action had explicitly stated that, regardless of the presence or absence of the fleet, the GHQ Air Force retained the responsibility for reconnaissance essential to its own com- bat efficiency as a striking force. Prior to 1939, however, Army avia- tion had been restricted from proceeding more than I O O miles beyond the shore line. There remains some question regarding the precise origin of this restriction, but the evidence indicates that it came initially from the Navy and was imposed in accordance with an agreement between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Joint exercises held in 1939 for the purpose of Army-Navy training had occasioned a strong protest on the part of the Army air commanders concerned, who argued that it was impos- sible to maintain the navigational efficiency of their units without flights beyond the Ioo-mile limit. It was accordingly agreed that longer flights might be undertaken provided special arrangements were in each instance made “well in advance.” Not only was this an administratively awkward arrangement calculated to discourage the development of any extensive training program, but the Air Corps thereafter became increasingly preoccupied with the many-sided problems of a gigantic program of expansion centering on the mission of strategic bombardment. December 1941 thus found those AAF 5 2 ’
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