The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
land-based bombers might well be the principal arm employed.
Furthermore, since most situations in which the Navy would be
called upon for coastal defense operations would be ones in which
the GHQ Air Force would also be involved as a striking force, the
Navy would, according to its own argument, gain control of Army
air forces in any tactical situation then considered likely to develop.
This, the Army felt, might lead ultimately to Navy control of all air
forces. As late as December 1941the problem was still under debate;
but unity of command in defense of the eastern coast, as far as
joint air action was concerned, for practical purposes was vested
in the commander of the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier
(NANCF) .*
The Navy, then, at the outbreak of war was responsible for the
protection of coastwise shipping and for the conduct of offshore
patrol. In other words, the responsibility for the development of anti-
submarine defenses lay with the Navy. The Army air arm, on the
other hand, was obliged to act in support of or in lieu of naval forces
should it be called upon to do so, that is to say, it had an emergency
responsibility. In addition, Joint Action had explicitly stated that,
regardless of the presence or absence of the fleet, the GHQ Air Force
retained the responsibility for reconnaissance essential to its own com-
bat efficiency as a striking force. Prior to 1939, however, Army avia-
tion had been restricted from proceeding more than I O O miles beyond
the shore line. There remains some question regarding the precise
origin of this restriction, but the evidence indicates that it came
initially from the Navy and was imposed in accordance with an
agreement between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief
of Staff, U.S. Army. Joint exercises held in 1939 for the purpose of
Army-Navy training had occasioned a strong protest on the part of
the Army air commanders concerned, who argued that it was impos-
sible to maintain the navigational efficiency of their units without
flights beyond the Ioo-mile limit. It was accordingly agreed that
longer flights might be undertaken provided special arrangements
were in each instance made “well in advance.” Not only was this an
administratively awkward arrangement calculated to discourage the
development of any extensive training program, but the Air Corps
thereafter became increasingly preoccupied with the many-sided
problems of a gigantic program of expansion centering on the mission
of strategic bombardment. December 1941 thus found those AAF
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