The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
installations as were necessary for operation, experimentation, and
training connected with the fleet. This legislation provided the basis
for the two air arms, but left undefined the responsibility in cases
where joint action might become necessary.'
After 1935 the controlling statement of policy on such points was
provided by Joint Action of the Army and Navy, an agreement
which sought to clarify the relationship between the two services but
which was marked at the same time, as previously noted, by ambi-
guity on certain crucial questions." By its provisions, the Navy held
responsibility for all inshore and offshore patrol for the purpose of
protecting shipping and defending the coastal frontiers, whereas the
Army held primary responsibility for defense of the coast itself.
Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy forces; and, conversely, Navy air-
craft might be called upon to support Army operations. In neither
case should any restriction be placed by one service on the freedom
of the other to use its power against the enemy should the need arise.
Each service was declared responsible for providing the aircraft re-
quired for the proper performance of its primary function-in the
Army's case, the conduct of air operations over land and such air
operations over the sea as were incident to the accomplishment of
Army functions; in the case of the Navy, conduct of operations over
the sea and such air operations over the land as were incident to the
accomplishment of Navy functions.' All of which left the respon-
sibility for the conduct of seaward patrols and the protection of ship-
ping definitely up to the Navy.
But this formal agreement did not preclude further discussion.
There remained, in particular, a question of command. It was still an
open question whether the Navy should control all air operations in
coastal defense or whether it should control only those operations
specifically in support of the fleet. Naval spokesmen claimed that
unity of command should be vested in whichever service held para-
mount importance in any given situation. Then, assuming that naval
pre-eminence existed in coastal defense, they claimed that unity of
command in such operations should rest with the Navy. The Army,
sensing a train of thought which might prove ruinous to its control of
air forces, raised its voice in protest. The assumption of naval pre-
eminence in coastal defense, it declared unsound. In some situations
* See above, p. 68.
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