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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 installations as were necessary for operation, experimentation, and training connected with the fleet. This legislation provided the basis for the two air arms, but left undefined the responsibility in cases where joint action might become necessary.' After 1935 the controlling statement of policy on such points was provided by Joint Action of the Army and Navy, an agreement which sought to clarify the relationship between the two services but which was marked at the same time, as previously noted, by ambi- guity on certain crucial questions." By its provisions, the Navy held responsibility for all inshore and offshore patrol for the purpose of protecting shipping and defending the coastal frontiers, whereas the Army held primary responsibility for defense of the coast itself. Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions in support of or in lieu of Navy forces; and, conversely, Navy air- craft might be called upon to support Army operations. In neither case should any restriction be placed by one service on the freedom of the other to use its power against the enemy should the need arise. Each service was declared responsible for providing the aircraft re- quired for the proper performance of its primary function-in the Army's case, the conduct of air operations over land and such air operations over the sea as were incident to the accomplishment of Army functions; in the case of the Navy, conduct of operations over the sea and such air operations over the land as were incident to the accomplishment of Navy functions.' All of which left the respon- sibility for the conduct of seaward patrols and the protection of ship- ping definitely up to the Navy. But this formal agreement did not preclude further discussion. There remained, in particular, a question of command. It was still an open question whether the Navy should control all air operations in coastal defense or whether it should control only those operations specifically in support of the fleet. Naval spokesmen claimed that unity of command should be vested in whichever service held para- mount importance in any given situation. Then, assuming that naval pre-eminence existed in coastal defense, they claimed that unity of command in such operations should rest with the Navy. The Army, sensing a train of thought which might prove ruinous to its control of air forces, raised its voice in protest. The assumption of naval pre- eminence in coastal defense, it declared unsound. In some situations * See above, p. 68. 520
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