The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
mobility comparable to that enjoyed by the U-boat command itself.'
But all such efforts foundered on the rocks of interservice contro-
versy. The story of the antisubmarine air effort becomes, therefore,
in no small part a story of jurisdictional and doctrinal debate punc-
tuated by a series of compromises ending in a final compromise by
which AAF forces withdrew from antisubmarine operations on the
understanding that the Navy would relinquish all claim to control of
long-range air striking forces operating from land bases.
It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a full narrative
of AAF antisubmarine activity. The bulk of that story falls chrono-
logically outside the limits of this volume. It is necessary here, how-
ever, to consider the emergency problem which confronted the AAF
on the outbreak of hostilities and the developments which led to the
creation of the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command in Oc-
tober 1942. The operations of that command and the controversy
which overshadowed its brief existence-extending from the fall of
1942 through the summer of 1943--will receive separate treatment in
the following volume.
T h e Question of Responsibility
Since the early development of military aviation in the United
States, the Army and the Navy had differed on certain points regard-
ing its control. With regard to land-based aviation engaged in sea-
ward patrol, each service took a logical enough position. T o the
Army, land-based aircraft whether operating over land or water
should be its responsibility. T o the Navy, it seemed equally natural
that operations over water against seaborne targets should be a naval
responsibility. But since the air constituted a medium which extended
over both land and water, arguments concerning its control could
drift more or less a t will for so long a time as national policy insisted
on regarding the air arm as subordinate to either the Army or the
Navy. It thus became a question that would have to be answered
arbitrarily by some competent authority.
As early as 1920 it had been recognized that, in providing an air
arm for both services, there lay a serious danger of duplicating instal-
lations and equipment. In that year Congress, accordingly, had deter-
mined that the Army air arm should have responsibility for all aerial
operations from land bases and that to naval aviation belonged all air
activity attached to the fleet, including the maintenance of such shore
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