The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
the German submarines confine their activity to that area. By Feb-
ruary they were operating in the Gulf Sea Frontier where, during the
ensuing two months, they accounted for eight merchant vessels, More
alarming than this relatively light attack in the Gulf was the fact that
by February a number of submarines had found excellent hunting in
the Caribbean, especially in the waters off Aruba, CuraGao, and
Trinidad; during February and March they sank a total of forty-two
merchant vessels in the Caribbean Sea F r ~ n t i e r . ~In short, enemy
submarines hunted with relative impunity along the American coasts
and with such success that they threatened the entire U.S. strategy in
the Atlantic.
One of the more remarkable facts about the war was the well-nigh
complete state of unreadiness in which this emergency caught the
nation. Although the German submarine campaign in World War I
lingered in the memory of Americans as a chief factor in our involve-
ment in that struggle, and although for two years past a second Ger-
man campaign had given repeated warning that the submarine again
would be relied upon chiefly to offset the weight of American re-
sources, when war came no master plan existed for coping with the
danger. It is true that we had extended our bases eastward to Iceland
with a view partly to the patrol of waters through which our ship-
ping must pass, and that in this effort the maintenance of air patrols
had been a primary consideration. But seemingly no one had seen fit
to develop comprehensive plans and forces specially designed to
counter the U-boat threat. As a result, the American war effort was
to be challenged until September 1942 by deadly assaults on coastwise
shipping, and not until the following summer would we be free of
the fear that Germany might effectively cut the line of supply which
supported our own and our allies’ operations in European and Medi-
terranean theaters.
Viewed broadly and from the vantage point provided by the lapse
of time, it would appear that the situation required the immediate
drafting of an over-all plan which viewed the Atlantic as a distinct
theater of operations and brought together under a single directing
agency all available resources to combat the submarine. In fact, such
a proposal was ultimately made, and as the menace grew, vigorous
efforts were expended to secure agreement a t least on a plan to con-
solidate available air weapons in one command created specifically
for the purpose of antisubmarine warfare and possessed of a strategic
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