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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
rines had concentrated on the waters adjacent to the British Isles.
Then, when British countermeasures made those areas too dangerous,
they had moved out into the convoy lanes. As air antisubmarine patrol
became more effective (in the summer of I 94 I , nearly one-third of
the damaging attacks against submarines were credited to aircraft)
the U-boats had moved still farther afield, extending their activity
westward to 49" and as far south as Africa. By November, submarine
activity off Newfoundland had brought from Adm. Harold R. Stark,
Chief of Naval Operations, a request that the number of Army planes
stationed a t the Newfoundland Airport be increased to the full extent
permitted by available facilities.2 And from Newfoundland it was
but a relatively short distance to the coastal frontiers of the United
States itself.
Indeed, the only surprising thing about the appearance of the
enemy in U.S. coastal waters was that it took the U-boats nearly a
month to become active there after our entry into the war. Adm.
Karl Doenitz, who more than any one else in the German High Com-
mand was in a position to know the submarine situation, has since
explained this delay by the fact that the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor came as a surprise to Germany's political and military leaders.
Hitherto, U-boat commanders had been restrained for political rea-
sons from operating in American waters; and when the declaration of
war removed those restraints, no submarines were immediately avail-
able for operations in the American coastal area. In December it
proved possible to send out only six equipped for this p u ~ p o s e . ~
When they came, however, the U-boats struck with deadly effect.
Beginning on 3 1 December, both Army and Navy sources began to
report the presence of enemy submarines in American waters. O n 7
January, COMINCH (Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy) reported
that a fleet of U-boats was believed to be proceeding southward from
the Newfoundland coast for an objective as yet unknown. T h e objec-
tive became quite apparent when, on I I January, the enemy sank the
SS Cyclops off Nova Scotia and torpedoed the tanker Norness three
days later off Long Island. These sinkings head the tragically long list
of similar losses in the coastal waters which served to bring home to
the American public the grim realities of total war. The situation rap-
idly grew desperate. During the seventy-six days following the sink-
ing of the Norness, fifty-nine ships, amounting to a total of over
350,000 gross tons, went down in the Eastern Sea Frontier. Nor did
5 1 5

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