“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
rines had concentrated on the waters adjacent to the British Isles.
Then, when British countermeasures made those areas too dangerous,
they had moved out into the convoy lanes. As air antisubmarine patrol
became more effective (in the summer of I 94 I , nearly one-third of
the damaging attacks against submarines were credited to aircraft)
the U-boats had moved still farther afield, extending their activity
westward to 49" and as far south as Africa. By November, submarine
activity off Newfoundland had brought from Adm. Harold R. Stark,
Chief of Naval Operations, a request that the number of Army planes
stationed a t the Newfoundland Airport be increased to the full extent
permitted by available facilities.2 And from Newfoundland it was
but a relatively short distance to the coastal frontiers of the United
States itself.
Indeed, the only surprising thing about the appearance of the
enemy in U.S. coastal waters was that it took the U-boats nearly a
month to become active there after our entry into the war. Adm.
Karl Doenitz, who more than any one else in the German High Com-
mand was in a position to know the submarine situation, has since
explained this delay by the fact that the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor came as a surprise to Germany's political and military leaders.
Hitherto, U-boat commanders had been restrained for political rea-
sons from operating in American waters; and when the declaration of
war removed those restraints, no submarines were immediately avail-
able for operations in the American coastal area. In December it
proved possible to send out only six equipped for this p u ~ p o s e . ~
When they came, however, the U-boats struck with deadly effect.
Beginning on 3 1 December, both Army and Navy sources began to
report the presence of enemy submarines in American waters. O n 7
January, COMINCH (Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy) reported
that a fleet of U-boats was believed to be proceeding southward from
the Newfoundland coast for an objective as yet unknown. T h e objec-
tive became quite apparent when, on I I January, the enemy sank the
SS Cyclops off Nova Scotia and torpedoed the tanker Norness three
days later off Long Island. These sinkings head the tragically long list
of similar losses in the coastal waters which served to bring home to
the American public the grim realities of total war. The situation rap-
idly grew desperate. During the seventy-six days following the sink-
ing of the Norness, fifty-nine ships, amounting to a total of over
350,000 gross tons, went down in the Eastern Sea Frontier. Nor did
5 1 5