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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C
rines had concentrated on the waters adjacent to the British Isles.
Then, when British countermeasures made those areas too dangerous,
they had moved out into the convoy lanes. As air antisubmarine patrol
became more effective (in the summer of I 94 I , nearly one-third of
the damaging attacks against submarines were credited to aircraft)
the U-boats had moved still farther afield, extending their activity
westward to 49" and as far south as Africa. By November, submarine
activity off Newfoundland had brought from Adm. Harold R. Stark,
Chief of Naval Operations, a request that the number of Army planes
stationed a t the Newfoundland Airport be increased to the full extent
permitted by available facilities.2 And from Newfoundland it was
but a relatively short distance to the coastal frontiers of the United
States itself.
Indeed, the only surprising thing about the appearance of the
enemy in U.S. coastal waters was that it took the U-boats nearly a
month to become active there after our entry into the war. Adm.
Karl Doenitz, who more than any one else in the German High Com-
mand was in a position to know the submarine situation, has since
explained this delay by the fact that the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor came as a surprise to Germany's political and military leaders.
Hitherto, U-boat commanders had been restrained for political rea-
sons from operating in American waters; and when the declaration of
war removed those restraints, no submarines were immediately avail-
able for operations in the American coastal area. In December it
proved possible to send out only six equipped for this p u ~ p o s e . ~
When they came, however, the U-boats struck with deadly effect.
Beginning on 3 1 December, both Army and Navy sources began to
report the presence of enemy submarines in American waters. O n 7
January, COMINCH (Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy) reported
that a fleet of U-boats was believed to be proceeding southward from
the Newfoundland coast for an objective as yet unknown. T h e objec-
tive became quite apparent when, on I I January, the enemy sank the
SS Cyclops off Nova Scotia and torpedoed the tanker Norness three
days later off Long Island. These sinkings head the tragically long list
of similar losses in the coastal waters which served to bring home to
the American public the grim realities of total war. The situation rap-
idly grew desperate. During the seventy-six days following the sink-
ing of the Norness, fifty-nine ships, amounting to a total of over
350,000 gross tons, went down in the Eastern Sea Frontier. Nor did
5 1 5

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