Documents / Document
This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E B A T T L E O F T H E A T L A N T I C rines had concentrated on the waters adjacent to the British Isles. Then, when British countermeasures made those areas too dangerous, they had moved out into the convoy lanes. As air antisubmarine patrol became more effective (in the summer of I 94 I , nearly one-third of the damaging attacks against submarines were credited to aircraft) the U-boats had moved still farther afield, extending their activity westward to 49" and as far south as Africa. By November, submarine activity off Newfoundland had brought from Adm. Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, a request that the number of Army planes stationed a t the Newfoundland Airport be increased to the full extent permitted by available facilities.2 And from Newfoundland it was but a relatively short distance to the coastal frontiers of the United States itself. Indeed, the only surprising thing about the appearance of the enemy in U.S. coastal waters was that it took the U-boats nearly a month to become active there after our entry into the war. Adm. Karl Doenitz, who more than any one else in the German High Com- mand was in a position to know the submarine situation, has since explained this delay by the fact that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to Germany's political and military leaders. Hitherto, U-boat commanders had been restrained for political rea- sons from operating in American waters; and when the declaration of war removed those restraints, no submarines were immediately avail- able for operations in the American coastal area. In December it proved possible to send out only six equipped for this p u ~ p o s e . ~ When they came, however, the U-boats struck with deadly effect. Beginning on 3 1 December, both Army and Navy sources began to report the presence of enemy submarines in American waters. O n 7 January, COMINCH (Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy) reported that a fleet of U-boats was believed to be proceeding southward from the Newfoundland coast for an objective as yet unknown. T h e objec- tive became quite apparent when, on I I January, the enemy sank the SS Cyclops off Nova Scotia and torpedoed the tanker Norness three days later off Long Island. These sinkings head the tragically long list of similar losses in the coastal waters which served to bring home to the American public the grim realities of total war. The situation rap- idly grew desperate. During the seventy-six days following the sink- ing of the Norness, fifty-nine ships, amounting to a total of over 350,000 gross tons, went down in the Eastern Sea Frontier. Nor did 5 1 5
Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.