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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 44 …By Armistice Day forty-five squadrons had been assigned to the front.” But with delays at…
  • p. 47 …up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the French Air Division…
  • p. 48 …One day mission was sufficiently large and suc- cessful to draw more than passing attention. O…
  • p. 80 …resignation from the Army came on the day after T R 440-15 was published. But…
  • p. 186 …War Plans Division to prepare the estimate independently as an Air Staff agency rather than as…
  • p. 258 …Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know than unless the US has not oppressed…
  • p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
  • p. 435 …Brady during days devoted by General Brereton chiefly to consultation with Aus- tralian, British, and Dutch…
  • p. 710 …During World War I, American military forces in Europe had achieved organizational and operational independence, but…
C H A P T E R 1s
* * * * * * * * * * *
THE AAF IN THE BATTLE
OF THE ATLANTIC
HILE undertaking to meet the emergency demands of
the Philippines, Hawaii, Java, India, China, Australia,
Wthe South Pacific, Alaska, and Panama, not to mentionother requirements of hemisphere defense, the AAF had been forced
to deal with still another emergency problem in the Atlantic. The
Germans fully appreciated the fact that American participation in the
European war would depend for its success on the free and rapid
movement of supply. Consequently, with the entry of the United
States into active warfare against the Axis, it became a key point in
German strategy to extend into American waters the counterblock-
ade already undertaken by the U-boat fleet in the eastern and north-
ern Atlantic. Except for a few planes which through the latter part
of 1941 co-operated with the Navy in patrol of the waters off New-
foundland, the air forces of the U.S. Army had received neither re-
sponsibility for antisubmarine warfare nor training in its techniques.
But they found themselves immediately after Pearl Harbor committed
extensively to antisubmarine patrol for want of other forces which
were both available and competent for the task.
That the Germans would move their U-boats into American coastal
waters as soon as practicable after the formal entry of the United
States into the war was implicit in the military situation as it de-
veloped from 1939 to 1941. The U-boat fleet was the only weapon
with which Germany could implement a counterblockade. And since
1939 the Germans had been operating against British and neutral
shipping at every opportunity in a campaign which, after the fall of
France, was greatly facilitated by the construction of five operating
bases on the Bay of Biscay. In the beginning of the war the subma-
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.