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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
C O M h X I T M E N T S T O C H I N A
veloped, and by American standards was grossly inefficient through-
out. Four different gauges of track required numerous extra handlings
of freight by slow-moving, physically weak native laborers. In eastern
India, further delays were imposed by the use of ferries instead of
bridges for crossing numerous streams; on the important Calcutta-
Assam line of communications, there existed not a single bridge over
the Brahmaputra River and its tributaries. T h e railways, already
weakened by a transfer of locomotives and rolling stock to Iran and
forced now to haul the products of the industrial centers of eastern
India which normally went by sea from Calcutta, were unable to
absorb American traffic without countless breakdowns and heart-
breaking delays. After a two-month voyage from the United States,
equipment generally took six additional weeks in moving from
Karachi to Assam. For goods to reach Kunming from Karachi, unless
entirely carried by air, it generally took longer than the voyage from
the United States.goThe highway system, which was in even worse
condition than the railroads, could not accommodate any appreciable
additional load. First-class, all-weather hiohways were rare, and even
these generally were too narrow to permit two-way traffic. The best
of them, too poorly graded and banked for efficient use by high-
speed vehicles, were frequently rendered impassable by monsoon
rains." Initially, however, the inadequacy of the highway system
hardly proved a major handicap, since very few trucks were available
to the Tenth. Because river boats ordinarily carried a considerable
volume of freight on the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers, that means
of transportation was not overlooked in the early planning, and espe-
cially in plans for the movement of cargoes between Calcutta and
Assam. Unfortunately the river-boat fleets, like rolling stock, required
extensive replacements. Moreover, the railway system had not been
planned to complement the riverways; main railway lines frequently
paralleled the course of the rivers, and this was particularly true in
eastern India.sz T h e communication system presented equally disturb-
ing problems. Telegraph and telephone lines extended to practically
every section of the country, but equipment and methods were hope-
lessly outmoded for military purposes.93
In setting up an air transport service for aid in overcoming these
difficulties, still other problems were met. Existing airfields had been
located and constructed primarily with a view to commercial rather
than military needs. Runways were generally too short and too lightly
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5"

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.