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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
C O M M I T M E N T S TO C H I N A
supply line upon which operations in China depended. Upon being
informed early in March that development of the air ferry ’ to China
would be a responsibility of the Tenth, General Brereton had re-
quested that ferrying personnel and equipment sent to the theater be
assigned to the air force. Brig. Gen. Robert Olds of the Air Corps
Ferrying Command objected on the ground that such an arrangement
would result in diversions from the transport service to combat
organization~.’~Brereton having renewed his request on 9 April, the
W a r Department replied that policies relating to the movement and
supply of planes would be administered throughout by a central office
in Washington, but that insofar as ferry operations were affected by
military developments in India the control would be exercised by
Brereton. T o this rather ambiguous explanation there was added the
information that the air freight service from Assam to China would
be operated by the 1st Ferrying Group under the control of Stil-
well.‘” General Arnold, after Brereton had indicated a continuing
concern over the uncertainties and confusion of command respon-
~ibilities,’~attempted to clarify the problem in a message to Stilwell
which declared that Brereton held responsibility and authority over
aircraft between Karachi and Calcutta, while General Stilwell would
control aircraft designated for service to China. T h e latter was also
vested with authority to change the location of operating stations and
ferry control detachments in both India and China. It further was
promised that an officer who fully understood ferrying operations
would be provided for Brereton’s staff.” T h e general statement of
policy, however ambiguous it seemed a t the time, at least provided
a principle of action which, with the passage of time and a better
understanding by all parties concerned, permitted the development
of a centralized control of strategic air services while not entirely
ignoring the normal prerogatives of a theater command in the event
of an extreme emergency. But the administrative division between
trans-India and India-China operations ran counter to the arguments
of experience soon gained in operating the service.
During his incumbency at Dinjan, Colonel Haynes had discarded
* Originally the term “ferry” was used in the CBI to describe organizations more
largely concerned with air transport operations than with the ferrying of aircraft.
It is possible that some of the misunderstandings which developed stemmed from
this loose usage, which in turn reflects the general difficulty experienced in clarify-
ing the many problems arising from this new type of air operation. (See above,
Chap. 9.)
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