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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
C O M M I T M E N T S TO C H I N A
supply line upon which operations in China depended. Upon being
informed early in March that development of the air ferry ’ to China
would be a responsibility of the Tenth, General Brereton had re-
quested that ferrying personnel and equipment sent to the theater be
assigned to the air force. Brig. Gen. Robert Olds of the Air Corps
Ferrying Command objected on the ground that such an arrangement
would result in diversions from the transport service to combat
organization~.’~Brereton having renewed his request on 9 April, the
W a r Department replied that policies relating to the movement and
supply of planes would be administered throughout by a central office
in Washington, but that insofar as ferry operations were affected by
military developments in India the control would be exercised by
Brereton. T o this rather ambiguous explanation there was added the
information that the air freight service from Assam to China would
be operated by the 1st Ferrying Group under the control of Stil-
well.‘” General Arnold, after Brereton had indicated a continuing
concern over the uncertainties and confusion of command respon-
~ibilities,’~attempted to clarify the problem in a message to Stilwell
which declared that Brereton held responsibility and authority over
aircraft between Karachi and Calcutta, while General Stilwell would
control aircraft designated for service to China. T h e latter was also
vested with authority to change the location of operating stations and
ferry control detachments in both India and China. It further was
promised that an officer who fully understood ferrying operations
would be provided for Brereton’s staff.” T h e general statement of
policy, however ambiguous it seemed a t the time, at least provided
a principle of action which, with the passage of time and a better
understanding by all parties concerned, permitted the development
of a centralized control of strategic air services while not entirely
ignoring the normal prerogatives of a theater command in the event
of an extreme emergency. But the administrative division between
trans-India and India-China operations ran counter to the arguments
of experience soon gained in operating the service.
During his incumbency at Dinjan, Colonel Haynes had discarded
* Originally the term “ferry” was used in the CBI to describe organizations more
largely concerned with air transport operations than with the ferrying of aircraft.
It is possible that some of the misunderstandings which developed stemmed from
this loose usage, which in turn reflects the general difficulty experienced in clarify-
ing the many problems arising from this new type of air operation. (See above,
Chap. 9.)
507

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