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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 Tenth-whose largest mission to date comprised a total of six bombers- would remain under theater control but with instructions for the time being to co-operate with the RAF,5gthe exchange also revealed some of the extraordinary perplexities of the CBI that would add to the story of air operations in that theater an unusually complex chap- ter on administration. There was no escape from the necessity to base in India any effort for the support of air operations in China, and thus no possibility of indifference to the security of India itself. Yet, the forces available were wholly inadequate for either mission, and they necessarily served chiefly as a token of intent. Changes thus tended to acquire a significance altogether out of proportion to the forces involved. Fortunately, the fear of enemy domination of the Indian Ocean was soon eased by indications that the Japanese fleet was withdrawing its units to Singapore, that Port Moresby in New Guinea rather than Ceylon was the enemy's next objective, and by the British landing at Madagascar on 4 May, which coincided with the enemy withdrawal after the Coral Sea action. Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision was rescinded by the W a r Department in a message to General Stilwell, who promptly replied that it would be recommitted to a mission primarily in support of China." Thus the mission of the Tenth Air Force remained as it had been originally fixed, but that mission still presented its own peculiar prob- lems of command. General Stilwell's responsibilities argued for the location of his headquarters a t Chungking, while practical considera- tions indicated that Brereton's headquarters should be in the base area of India. At the same time, it was evident that the principal combat effort of AAF units in the CBI must be made in China. Hundreds of miles and imperfect communications consequently separated the two American headquarters, and, similarly, the ranking air headquarters would be far removed from the principal area of combat operations. Some of the difficulties inherent in this arrangement already had been indicated. When in March it became known that only ten P-40's were carried by the convoy from Australia, General Brereton sought the assignment to the Tenth of the pursuit planes destined for the A V G by way of Africa and Karachi, only to be turned down by the War Department.'l Thereupon, he suggested that the A V G immediately be inducted into the AAF and be assigned as a pursuit group under Chennault's command, to the Tenth Air Force.62 Induction of the 504
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