“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Tenth-whose largest mission to date comprised a total of six bombers-
would remain under theater control but with instructions for the
time being to co-operate with the RAF,5gthe exchange also revealed
some of the extraordinary perplexities of the CBI that would add to
the story of air operations in that theater an unusually complex chap-
ter on administration. There was no escape from the necessity to
base in India any effort for the support of air operations in China,
and thus no possibility of indifference to the security of India itself.
Yet, the forces available were wholly inadequate for either mission,
and they necessarily served chiefly as a token of intent. Changes thus
tended to acquire a significance altogether out of proportion to the
forces involved. Fortunately, the fear of enemy domination of the
Indian Ocean was soon eased by indications that the Japanese fleet
was withdrawing its units to Singapore, that Port Moresby in New
Guinea rather than Ceylon was the enemy's next objective, and by
the British landing at Madagascar on 4 May, which coincided with
the enemy withdrawal after the Coral Sea action. Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision was rescinded by the W a r Department in a
message to General Stilwell, who promptly replied that it would be
recommitted to a mission primarily in support of China."
Thus the mission of the Tenth Air Force remained as it had been
originally fixed, but that mission still presented its own peculiar prob-
lems of command. General Stilwell's responsibilities argued for the
location of his headquarters a t Chungking, while practical considera-
tions indicated that Brereton's headquarters should be in the base area
of India. At the same time, it was evident that the principal combat
effort of AAF units in the CBI must be made in China. Hundreds of
miles and imperfect communications consequently separated the two
American headquarters, and, similarly, the ranking air headquarters
would be far removed from the principal area of combat operations.
Some of the difficulties inherent in this arrangement already had been
indicated. When in March it became known that only ten P-40's were
carried by the convoy from Australia, General Brereton sought the
assignment to the Tenth of the pursuit planes destined for the A V G
by way of Africa and Karachi, only to be turned down by the War
Department.'l Thereupon, he suggested that the A V G immediately
be inducted into the AAF and be assigned as a pursuit group under
Chennault's command, to the Tenth Air Force.62 Induction of the
504