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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
C O M M I T M E N T S T O C H I N A transport operations for the movement of supplies to China had been overly optimistic; the crucial air link in the supply line would have to be longer than had been anticipated, and plans would have to be revised to take into consideration new operational hazards and a heavier demand for equipment and personnel. There were other ques- tions of similar import and difficulty, but all of them tended to turn on a basic question of mission which had become involved in a some- what complex problem of command. Command difficulties had first arisen with the flying of the Tenth’s initial combat mission on z April. At the conference between Stilwell and Brereton late in March, it had been agreed that the air force when ready would be used in support of Allied forces in Burma. General Stilwell consequently received with some surprise the news of the Andaman Islands mission; and General Brereton, who regarded the function of the heavy bomber as distinct from that of air-ground support, was similarly surprised to receive a prompt request from the theater commander for a report on the capabilities of the air force in order that he might plan for its use in support of critical ground op- e r a t i o n ~ . ~ ~T h e mission itself had been flown against enemy forces whose threatening position with reference to India and Ceylon caused the British to propose to Washington a close co-ordination of de- fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the War Department informed Stilwell that the American air force would be used in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean area north of Ceylon in conformity with British plans.56But General Stilwell, fearful of the interpretation that might be placed on the action by the Chinese, protested a decision made without reference to him as theater com- mander and meanwhile withheld the appropriate orders to B r e r e t ~ n . ~ ~ And so when the latter, who had been informed of the War Depart- ment message to Stilwell, was shown a message from the Air Ministry in London confirming the agreement and urging that it be put into immediate effect, he had little choice but to seek direction from the War Department, pointing out that he lacked instructions either from Washington or the theater. In reply, he promptly received a directive to co-operate with the British as r e q ~ e s t e d . ~ ~But while this served well enough to clarify his immediate responsibility, it left a delicate problem of his relation to the theater command. If there were elements of the comic opera in the continuing ex- change of messages which preceded a general understanding that the 503
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