The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

C O M M I T M E N T S T O C H I N A
transport operations for the movement of supplies to China had been
overly optimistic; the crucial air link in the supply line would have
to be longer than had been anticipated, and plans would have to be
revised to take into consideration new operational hazards and a
heavier demand for equipment and personnel. There were other ques-
tions of similar import and difficulty, but all of them tended to turn
on a basic question of mission which had become involved in a some-
what complex problem of command.
Command difficulties had first arisen with the flying of the Tenth’s
initial combat mission on z April. At the conference between Stilwell
and Brereton late in March, it had been agreed that the air force when
ready would be used in support of Allied forces in Burma. General
Stilwell consequently received with some surprise the news of the
Andaman Islands mission; and General Brereton, who regarded the
function of the heavy bomber as distinct from that of air-ground
support, was similarly surprised to receive a prompt request from the
theater commander for a report on the capabilities of the air force in
order that he might plan for its use in support of critical ground op-
e r a t i o n ~ . ~ ~T h e mission itself had been flown against enemy forces
whose threatening position with reference to India and Ceylon caused
the British to propose to Washington a close co-ordination of de-
fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department informed Stilwell that the American air force would
be used in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean area north of Ceylon
in conformity with British plans.56But General Stilwell, fearful of the
interpretation that might be placed on the action by the Chinese,
protested a decision made without reference to him as theater com-
mander and meanwhile withheld the appropriate orders to B r e r e t ~ n . ~ ~
And so when the latter, who had been informed of the War Depart-
ment message to Stilwell, was shown a message from the Air Ministry
in London confirming the agreement and urging that it be put into
immediate effect, he had little choice but to seek direction from the
War Department, pointing out that he lacked instructions either from
Washington or the theater. In reply, he promptly received a directive
to co-operate with the British as r e q ~ e s t e d . ~ ~But while this served
well enough to clarify his immediate responsibility, it left a delicate
problem of his relation to the theater command.
If there were elements of the comic opera in the continuing ex-
change of messages which preceded a general understanding that the
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