“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
C O M M I T M E N T S T O C H I N A
transport operations for the movement of supplies to China had been
overly optimistic; the crucial air link in the supply line would have
to be longer than had been anticipated, and plans would have to be
revised to take into consideration new operational hazards and a
heavier demand for equipment and personnel. There were other ques-
tions of similar import and difficulty, but all of them tended to turn
on a basic question of mission which had become involved in a some-
what complex problem of command.
Command difficulties had first arisen with the flying of the Tenth’s
initial combat mission on z April. At the conference between Stilwell
and Brereton late in March, it had been agreed that the air force when
ready would be used in support of Allied forces in Burma. General
Stilwell consequently received with some surprise the news of the
Andaman Islands mission; and General Brereton, who regarded the
function of the heavy bomber as distinct from that of air-ground
support, was similarly surprised to receive a prompt request from the
theater commander for a report on the capabilities of the air force in
order that he might plan for its use in support of critical ground op-
e r a t i o n ~ . ~ ~T h e mission itself had been flown against enemy forces
whose threatening position with reference to India and Ceylon caused
the British to propose to Washington a close co-ordination of de-
fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department informed Stilwell that the American air force would
be used in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean area north of Ceylon
in conformity with British plans.56But General Stilwell, fearful of the
interpretation that might be placed on the action by the Chinese,
protested a decision made without reference to him as theater com-
mander and meanwhile withheld the appropriate orders to B r e r e t ~ n . ~ ~
And so when the latter, who had been informed of the War Depart-
ment message to Stilwell, was shown a message from the Air Ministry
in London confirming the agreement and urging that it be put into
immediate effect, he had little choice but to seek direction from the
War Department, pointing out that he lacked instructions either from
Washington or the theater. In reply, he promptly received a directive
to co-operate with the British as r e q ~ e s t e d . ~ ~But while this served
well enough to clarify his immediate responsibility, it left a delicate
problem of his relation to the theater command.
If there were elements of the comic opera in the continuing ex-
change of messages which preceded a general understanding that the
503