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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
C O M M I T M E N T S T O C H I N A
transport operations for the movement of supplies to China had been
overly optimistic; the crucial air link in the supply line would have
to be longer than had been anticipated, and plans would have to be
revised to take into consideration new operational hazards and a
heavier demand for equipment and personnel. There were other ques-
tions of similar import and difficulty, but all of them tended to turn
on a basic question of mission which had become involved in a some-
what complex problem of command.
Command difficulties had first arisen with the flying of the Tenth’s
initial combat mission on z April. At the conference between Stilwell
and Brereton late in March, it had been agreed that the air force when
ready would be used in support of Allied forces in Burma. General
Stilwell consequently received with some surprise the news of the
Andaman Islands mission; and General Brereton, who regarded the
function of the heavy bomber as distinct from that of air-ground
support, was similarly surprised to receive a prompt request from the
theater commander for a report on the capabilities of the air force in
order that he might plan for its use in support of critical ground op-
e r a t i o n ~ . ~ ~T h e mission itself had been flown against enemy forces
whose threatening position with reference to India and Ceylon caused
the British to propose to Washington a close co-ordination of de-
fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department informed Stilwell that the American air force would
be used in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean area north of Ceylon
in conformity with British plans.56But General Stilwell, fearful of the
interpretation that might be placed on the action by the Chinese,
protested a decision made without reference to him as theater com-
mander and meanwhile withheld the appropriate orders to B r e r e t ~ n . ~ ~
And so when the latter, who had been informed of the War Depart-
ment message to Stilwell, was shown a message from the Air Ministry
in London confirming the agreement and urging that it be put into
immediate effect, he had little choice but to seek direction from the
War Department, pointing out that he lacked instructions either from
Washington or the theater. In reply, he promptly received a directive
to co-operate with the British as r e q ~ e s t e d . ~ ~But while this served
well enough to clarify his immediate responsibility, it left a delicate
problem of his relation to the theater command.
If there were elements of the comic opera in the continuing ex-
change of messages which preceded a general understanding that the
503

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