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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
C O M M I T M E N T S TO C H I N A
flares to illuminate the target and then unloaded forty-two 250- and
300-lb. bombs. No enemy fighters challenged the effort and heavy
flak was evaded, but numerous searchlights made it impossible to
estimate the results of the bombing. Once more, on 2 9 April, a flight
of bombers hit the docks a t Rangoon with 500-lb. bombs. The enemy
put up interceptors and antiaircraft fire, but all planes returned with-
out damage.48On the nights of 5 and 6 May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using as a base for interceptors. O n the night of the Sth, two
flights of two B-17’s each scored hits on a hangar and parked planes;
it was estimated that forty planes had been destroyed and twenty-five
damaged, but searchlights, antiaircraft fire, and attacking enemy fight-
ers made accurate observation difficult. On the following night, three
B-17’s scored a direct hit on a fuel dump. O n the night of 9 May,
six B-17’s engaged in a joint attack on Mingaladon and the Rangoon
docks. Though attempted interception by the enemy failed, it pre-
vented accurate observation of bombing results.*’
At this point, attention was drawn from Rangoon by the capture
on 8 May of Myitkyina. Recently counted upon as a key base on the
air route to China, its airfield now represented a serious threat to the
whole air cargo project. Dinjan lay within easy range of fighters based
at Myitkyina, and until more adequate provision could be made for
the defense of Dinjan, Myitkyina became a target of prime impor-
tance to Tenth Air Force bombers. The heavies ran their first mission
in direct defense of the air cargo line to China on 1 2 May when four
B-r7’s, flying from Dum Dum, heavily damaged the runways and
fired several parked aircraft in a daylight attack on Myitkyina airfield.
T w o days later the attack was repeated with further damage to run-
ways and the destruction of several buildings. After another two-day
interval, a third attack followed. Reconnaissance after the mission
revealed no signs of activity at the airdrome, which for a time a t least
was in an unusable state.“
T o the transport pilots themselves had actually fallen the most dra-
matic role for American airmen in the attempt to defend Burma.
Pressed immediately on arrival at Dinjan into emergency deliveries
of ammunition, fuel, and supplies to the Allied forces in Burma, they
brought out on the return flights an increasing number of wounded
troops and civilian refugees. When after the fall of Mandalay it be-
came obvious that Myitkyina and Loiwing were also doomed, Army
501

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.