“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
C O M M I T M E N T S TO C H I N A
flares to illuminate the target and then unloaded forty-two 250- and
300-lb. bombs. No enemy fighters challenged the effort and heavy
flak was evaded, but numerous searchlights made it impossible to
estimate the results of the bombing. Once more, on 2 9 April, a flight
of bombers hit the docks a t Rangoon with 500-lb. bombs. The enemy
put up interceptors and antiaircraft fire, but all planes returned with-
out damage.48On the nights of 5 and 6 May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using as a base for interceptors. O n the night of the Sth, two
flights of two B-17’s each scored hits on a hangar and parked planes;
it was estimated that forty planes had been destroyed and twenty-five
damaged, but searchlights, antiaircraft fire, and attacking enemy fight-
ers made accurate observation difficult. On the following night, three
B-17’s scored a direct hit on a fuel dump. O n the night of 9 May,
six B-17’s engaged in a joint attack on Mingaladon and the Rangoon
docks. Though attempted interception by the enemy failed, it pre-
vented accurate observation of bombing results.*’
At this point, attention was drawn from Rangoon by the capture
on 8 May of Myitkyina. Recently counted upon as a key base on the
air route to China, its airfield now represented a serious threat to the
whole air cargo project. Dinjan lay within easy range of fighters based
at Myitkyina, and until more adequate provision could be made for
the defense of Dinjan, Myitkyina became a target of prime impor-
tance to Tenth Air Force bombers. The heavies ran their first mission
in direct defense of the air cargo line to China on 1 2 May when four
B-r7’s, flying from Dum Dum, heavily damaged the runways and
fired several parked aircraft in a daylight attack on Myitkyina airfield.
T w o days later the attack was repeated with further damage to run-
ways and the destruction of several buildings. After another two-day
interval, a third attack followed. Reconnaissance after the mission
revealed no signs of activity at the airdrome, which for a time a t least
was in an unusable state.“
T o the transport pilots themselves had actually fallen the most dra-
matic role for American airmen in the attempt to defend Burma.
Pressed immediately on arrival at Dinjan into emergency deliveries
of ammunition, fuel, and supplies to the Allied forces in Burma, they
brought out on the return flights an increasing number of wounded
troops and civilian refugees. When after the fall of Mandalay it be-
came obvious that Myitkyina and Loiwing were also doomed, Army
501