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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 47 …s Independent Force, the whole of the French Air Division (strategic reserve), and Italian and Portuguese…
  • p. 113 …Japanese Air Power The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air arms, had…
  • p. 119 …naval air service, and a colonial air force.” For their air doctrines, the Italians depended almost…
  • p. 120 …In its first “combat” test during the thirties the Italian Air Force faced no real opposition…
  • p. 121 …The hope was not fulfilled, for numerous weaknesses in the Italian Air Force rapidly came to…
  • p. 122 …The fundamental weakness of the Italian Air Force was not in its theory of air power…
  • p. 197 …naval forces, and within prescribed boundaries to destroy any German and Italian naval, air, and ground…
  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 554 …Chennault, who since 1937 had been serving as special adviser to the Chinese Air Force. Known…
  • p. 705 …Brett, Chief of the Air Corps, to England for study of the problem. Specifically, he was…
  • p. 752 …USSBS, Japanese Air Power. 9. Notes on the Italian Air Force, in special file of Brig…
  • p. 805 …History, First Air Force. 44. History, Caribbean Air Force, 8 May 1941-6 Mar. 1942, p…
  • p. 851 …E S Italian Air Force: 82-85; development, Italian East Africa, 84 Italy, Air Ministry, 82…
  • p. 857 …See Italian Air Force. Reinforcements. See theaters. Renault works, 593 Replacement Control Depot, ~ z t h…
C O M M I T M E N T S TO C H I N A
flares to illuminate the target and then unloaded forty-two 250- and
300-lb. bombs. No enemy fighters challenged the effort and heavy
flak was evaded, but numerous searchlights made it impossible to
estimate the results of the bombing. Once more, on 2 9 April, a flight
of bombers hit the docks a t Rangoon with 500-lb. bombs. The enemy
put up interceptors and antiaircraft fire, but all planes returned with-
out damage.48On the nights of 5 and 6 May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using as a base for interceptors. O n the night of the Sth, two
flights of two B-17’s each scored hits on a hangar and parked planes;
it was estimated that forty planes had been destroyed and twenty-five
damaged, but searchlights, antiaircraft fire, and attacking enemy fight-
ers made accurate observation difficult. On the following night, three
B-17’s scored a direct hit on a fuel dump. O n the night of 9 May,
six B-17’s engaged in a joint attack on Mingaladon and the Rangoon
docks. Though attempted interception by the enemy failed, it pre-
vented accurate observation of bombing results.*’
At this point, attention was drawn from Rangoon by the capture
on 8 May of Myitkyina. Recently counted upon as a key base on the
air route to China, its airfield now represented a serious threat to the
whole air cargo project. Dinjan lay within easy range of fighters based
at Myitkyina, and until more adequate provision could be made for
the defense of Dinjan, Myitkyina became a target of prime impor-
tance to Tenth Air Force bombers. The heavies ran their first mission
in direct defense of the air cargo line to China on 1 2 May when four
B-r7’s, flying from Dum Dum, heavily damaged the runways and
fired several parked aircraft in a daylight attack on Myitkyina airfield.
T w o days later the attack was repeated with further damage to run-
ways and the destruction of several buildings. After another two-day
interval, a third attack followed. Reconnaissance after the mission
revealed no signs of activity at the airdrome, which for a time a t least
was in an unusable state.“
T o the transport pilots themselves had actually fallen the most dra-
matic role for American airmen in the attempt to defend Burma.
Pressed immediately on arrival at Dinjan into emergency deliveries
of ammunition, fuel, and supplies to the Allied forces in Burma, they
brought out on the return flights an increasing number of wounded
troops and civilian refugees. When after the fall of Mandalay it be-
came obvious that Myitkyina and Loiwing were also doomed, Army
501

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.