“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
C O M M I T M E N T S TO C H I N A
Colonel Haynes arrived a t Dinjan to assume his new duties on 2 3
April. With him was Col. Robert L. Scott, who had flown out in
the same flight from the United States, and they were joined at Dinjan
by Col. Merian C. Cooper. The task confronting them, to say the
le‘ast, was discouraging. Although the equipment of the Americans
was limited to thirteen DC-3’s and C-47’s, the single airfield already
accommodated two British squadrons and was so crowded as to make
proper dispersal of aircraft impossible. While barracks were under
construction, the men were housed in mud and bamboo bashas with
dirt floors. Messing facilities were poor; the quality of the food worse.
Quartered more than ten miles from the airdrome, the Americans
depended entirely on the British for ground tran~portation.~~Even
more disconcerting was the absence of anything approaching an ade-
quate defense against air attack by the Japanese. A single British pur-
suit squadron operated without benefit of an air warning system, and
there were no antiaircraft guns.4s T o avoid the probably disastrous
effect of a sudden attack, the Americans undertook to get their planes
into the air by dawn, and all servicing and cargo operations for planes
landing during the day had to be handled with the utmost expedition.
Under these circumstances, ordinary working hours were out of the
question. The men generally worked from long before daybreak until
late at night.44
The command had begun operations at a crucial point in the Japa-
nese campaign for Burma. Following his capture of Rangoon, the
enemy had grouped forces for a drive on Mandalay, key city of cen-
tral Burma. General Stilwell, commanding the Chinese Fifth and
Sixth armies, joined the British in an attempt to establish an effective
line of defense. But by 25 March the Japanese had passed beyond
Toungoo, by z April had forced the evacuation of Prome, and thus
compelled the Allied forces to abandon their first line of defense.
Their withdrawal to the north turned into a full retreat, and then
under incessant pressure from the Japanese into a rout. Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V G forces withdrew. During the last week in April, Lashio,
railhead for the Burma Road, fell; and by the opening of May, Man-
dalay had been captured. The campaign drew quickly to a close. On
the 6th the Japanese made their position in the southeast secure by
taking Akyab on the Bay of Bengal, the point originally selected by
General Brady as a base for American bombers. The following day
499