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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
C O M M I T M E N T S TO C H I N A
Colonel Haynes arrived a t Dinjan to assume his new duties on 2 3
April. With him was Col. Robert L. Scott, who had flown out in
the same flight from the United States, and they were joined at Dinjan
by Col. Merian C. Cooper. The task confronting them, to say the
le‘ast, was discouraging. Although the equipment of the Americans
was limited to thirteen DC-3’s and C-47’s, the single airfield already
accommodated two British squadrons and was so crowded as to make
proper dispersal of aircraft impossible. While barracks were under
construction, the men were housed in mud and bamboo bashas with
dirt floors. Messing facilities were poor; the quality of the food worse.
Quartered more than ten miles from the airdrome, the Americans
depended entirely on the British for ground tran~portation.~~Even
more disconcerting was the absence of anything approaching an ade-
quate defense against air attack by the Japanese. A single British pur-
suit squadron operated without benefit of an air warning system, and
there were no antiaircraft guns.4s T o avoid the probably disastrous
effect of a sudden attack, the Americans undertook to get their planes
into the air by dawn, and all servicing and cargo operations for planes
landing during the day had to be handled with the utmost expedition.
Under these circumstances, ordinary working hours were out of the
question. The men generally worked from long before daybreak until
late at night.44
The command had begun operations at a crucial point in the Japa-
nese campaign for Burma. Following his capture of Rangoon, the
enemy had grouped forces for a drive on Mandalay, key city of cen-
tral Burma. General Stilwell, commanding the Chinese Fifth and
Sixth armies, joined the British in an attempt to establish an effective
line of defense. But by 25 March the Japanese had passed beyond
Toungoo, by z April had forced the evacuation of Prome, and thus
compelled the Allied forces to abandon their first line of defense.
Their withdrawal to the north turned into a full retreat, and then
under incessant pressure from the Japanese into a rout. Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V G forces withdrew. During the last week in April, Lashio,
railhead for the Burma Road, fell; and by the opening of May, Man-
dalay had been captured. The campaign drew quickly to a close. On
the 6th the Japanese made their position in the southeast secure by
taking Akyab on the Bay of Bengal, the point originally selected by
General Brady as a base for American bombers. The following day
499

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