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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 47 …s Independent Force, the whole of the French Air Division (strategic reserve), and Italian and Portuguese…
  • p. 113 …Japanese Air Power The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air arms, had…
  • p. 119 …naval air service, and a colonial air force.” For their air doctrines, the Italians depended almost…
  • p. 120 …In its first “combat” test during the thirties the Italian Air Force faced no real opposition…
  • p. 121 …The hope was not fulfilled, for numerous weaknesses in the Italian Air Force rapidly came to…
  • p. 122 …The fundamental weakness of the Italian Air Force was not in its theory of air power…
  • p. 197 …naval forces, and within prescribed boundaries to destroy any German and Italian naval, air, and ground…
  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 554 …Chennault, who since 1937 had been serving as special adviser to the Chinese Air Force. Known…
  • p. 705 …Brett, Chief of the Air Corps, to England for study of the problem. Specifically, he was…
  • p. 752 …USSBS, Japanese Air Power. 9. Notes on the Italian Air Force, in special file of Brig…
  • p. 805 …History, First Air Force. 44. History, Caribbean Air Force, 8 May 1941-6 Mar. 1942, p…
  • p. 851 …E S Italian Air Force: 82-85; development, Italian East Africa, 84 Italy, Air Ministry, 82…
  • p. 857 …See Italian Air Force. Reinforcements. See theaters. Renault works, 593 Replacement Control Depot, ~ z t h…
C O M M I T M E N T S TO C H I N A
Colonel Haynes arrived a t Dinjan to assume his new duties on 2 3
April. With him was Col. Robert L. Scott, who had flown out in
the same flight from the United States, and they were joined at Dinjan
by Col. Merian C. Cooper. The task confronting them, to say the
le‘ast, was discouraging. Although the equipment of the Americans
was limited to thirteen DC-3’s and C-47’s, the single airfield already
accommodated two British squadrons and was so crowded as to make
proper dispersal of aircraft impossible. While barracks were under
construction, the men were housed in mud and bamboo bashas with
dirt floors. Messing facilities were poor; the quality of the food worse.
Quartered more than ten miles from the airdrome, the Americans
depended entirely on the British for ground tran~portation.~~Even
more disconcerting was the absence of anything approaching an ade-
quate defense against air attack by the Japanese. A single British pur-
suit squadron operated without benefit of an air warning system, and
there were no antiaircraft guns.4s T o avoid the probably disastrous
effect of a sudden attack, the Americans undertook to get their planes
into the air by dawn, and all servicing and cargo operations for planes
landing during the day had to be handled with the utmost expedition.
Under these circumstances, ordinary working hours were out of the
question. The men generally worked from long before daybreak until
late at night.44
The command had begun operations at a crucial point in the Japa-
nese campaign for Burma. Following his capture of Rangoon, the
enemy had grouped forces for a drive on Mandalay, key city of cen-
tral Burma. General Stilwell, commanding the Chinese Fifth and
Sixth armies, joined the British in an attempt to establish an effective
line of defense. But by 25 March the Japanese had passed beyond
Toungoo, by z April had forced the evacuation of Prome, and thus
compelled the Allied forces to abandon their first line of defense.
Their withdrawal to the north turned into a full retreat, and then
under incessant pressure from the Japanese into a rout. Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V G forces withdrew. During the last week in April, Lashio,
railhead for the Burma Road, fell; and by the opening of May, Man-
dalay had been captured. The campaign drew quickly to a close. On
the 6th the Japanese made their position in the southeast secure by
taking Akyab on the Bay of Bengal, the point originally selected by
General Brady as a base for American bombers. The following day
499

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