The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

C O M M I T M E N T S TO C H I N A
graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to
make high-altitude bombing of questionable value and argued for the
superior speed of the mediums. T h e supply at the time, however, was
unequal to the demand, and only in late April was it agreed, in partial
concession to his continued requests, that the 7 th Bombardment
Group should be converted into a composite group of two heavy and
two medium squadrons, the latter to be equipped with B - z ~ ’ s . ~ ~Not
until July did the B-25’s arrive in sufficient numbers to permit com-
mitment of one of the squadrons to combat. H e also sought fighters
superior to the P-40, and received the promise of P-38’s at some in-
definite time in the But the Tenth would get along with the
P-40 for more than a year, and for a while yet with few of them.
Although General Brereton had brought out of Java a few key
personnel for the new air force, there were several important posts
for which no qualified men were available. Consequently, one of his
first acts after assuming command had been to radio Washington
asking assignment from the staff of the North African mission in
Egypt of Col. Victor H. Strahm to be his A-3 and Brig. Gen. Elmer
E. Adler to establish an air service command. T h e assignment of
Strahm was promptly approved, but some delay was experienced in
securing the transfer of General Adler, who as chief of the air sec-
tion of the North African mission since the fall of 1941 had gained
a variety of experience which made him especially well qualified to
undertake the planning and establishment of air services in the new
theater. N o t until 2 6 April did he arrive in India. With him came
Lt. Col. Reuben C. Hood, Jr., and Capt. Gwen Atkinson, and on
I May, with only Adler, Hood, and Atkinson on hand, the air service
command was a c t i ~ a t e d . ~ ~Until the arrival of the convoy from
America two weeks later with supplies and additional personnel, the
command remained in effect a small planning staff.
Meanwhile, to Brereton’s chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Earl L. Naiden,
had fallen the task of planning an air transport service from India
to China, a problem that took on increasing significance as the Japa-
nese pressed forward in Burma. Foreseeing the loss of Rangoon, the
W a r Department had directed Brereton shortly after his arrival in
India to survey an air route for the movement of supplies from India
to Ch~ngking.’~At the time, it was felt that central and northern
Burma could probably be defended; and so the problem appeared to
be that of providing for an air lift of supplies from Assam in the
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