The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
who had lost their edge on long sea voyages grew more stale as they
awaited their turns with the few planes on hand. Shortages of tools
and other equipment were acute. The men lived in an area barren of
trees and grass on the edge of the Sind desert, from which sand and
dust provided a well-nigh constant annoyance. Rations were British.
Reading matter, cigarettes, candies, beer, and ordinary post exchange
supplies were unobtainable. Worst of all was the lack of mail. Having
been constantly on the move, most of the men had received no news
from their families since leaving the United States in December or
J a n ~ a r y . ~O
General Brereton located his own headquarters at New Delhi in
order to be near the several British authorities with whom he would
have to deal, and there in March he held a series of conferences on
some of the larger questions pertaining to the establishment of the
Tenth. The critical shortage of shipping directed the attention of the
conferees particularly to resources available in India, for it was evi-
dent that a policy of living off the land would have to be followed
insofar as it was possible. There were delays because of the necessity
for co-ordination of action with both London and Washington, but
the discussions progressed smoothly and prepared the way for suc-
cessful collaboration in the implementation of policies which over
the ensuing years assured, under the provisions of reverse lend-lease,
substantial assistance for the Fortunately, in April a
technical mission headed by Mr. Henry F. Grady arrived from the
United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with
reference to the needs of American forces, and it thus became pos-
sible for General Brereton to concentrate on pressing matters of a
more strictly military
Already Brereton had passed on to AAF Headquarters the benefit
of his firsthand experience with combat units in the Philippines,
Australia, and Java. While recognizing the critical need which had
forced the sending out of imperfectly trained units even before the
outbreak of hostilities, he now urged that personnel be fully trained
and equipped before shipment overseas, whatever cost of delay in
forwarding reinforcements might be entailed.33 His suggestions in-
cluded detailed recommendations for training and improvement of
equipment and For his own force, he pleaded especially for
medium bombers. Limited target areas located a t distances which pre-
cluded the use of fighter escort, the lack of reconnaissance and photo-
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