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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
C O M M I T M E N T S T O C H I N A
Similarly, misunderstanding developed regarding the movement of
P-40's for the 23d Group. In the absence of exact information as to
the rate of their progress across Africa, the W a r Department was in-
clined to assume that unreported planes had reached India, when
many were stopped along the way, some of them wrecked beyond
repair and others requiring a major overhaul before they could con-
tinue. Even when a plane had arrived at Karachi, its engine was
probably burned out and would have to be replaced-at a time when
aircraft engines were almost as scarce as the aircraft themselves.27
Exact figures for this early period are virtually impossible to estab-
lish. But the whole story can be put in a capsule: in June, General
Brereton left for the Middle East with virtually the entire striking
force of the Tenth; in so doing, he took out the approximate equiva-
lent of the tiny force of which he had assumed command four months
before; and in the interval it had been possible to conduct operations
only on the most meager scale.
In March, the impending loss of all Burma and the threat to India
itself had resulted in the selection of Karachi as a port of entry and
a center for the preparation of incoming organizations. Located on
the western side of India, it was free, for the moment at least, from
the threat of enemy interference and was advantageously situated
with reference to air and water routes upon which operations in the
CBI would be chiefly dependent. T o General Brady was assigned the
responsibility for establishing there a reception, classification, and
training center that eventually, together with the installations of the
Air Transport Command, became one of the major centers of AAF
activity in the East.* 2 8 Brig. Gen. Raymond Wheeler, of the Services
of Supply, came there from Iran to undertake, while preparing plans
for theater supply, improvement in the docking and storage facilities
of a port hitherto not fully de~eloped.'~Meanwhile, the several hun-
dred AAF personnel who had recently arrived from Australia gave
their attention to the completion of a partially prepared British en-
campment for their own occupancy and to the inauguration of a
training program. There was plenty to do, but morale inevitably
reached an unusually low ebb. A thousand miles from the battle in
Burma, their handful of planes was held in anticipation of enemy
moves which might include attacks on the western ports of India;
yet there were not enough aircraft even for training. Pilots and crews
* See above, pp. 333, 340.
495

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