“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
week, and Calcutta, chief port of India, had been rendered unsafe
by enemy action on the periphery of the Bay of Bengal. The loss of
all Burma seemed imminent, an invasion of India not unlikely.
Hope of substantial reinforcement, even the prospect of receiving
the minimum administrative complement of an air force, depended
upon a line of communications extending across the Indian and At-
lantic oceans by way of the Cape of Good Hope, for Australia had
need of all the limited resources available there. Moreover, the Japa-
nese conquest of Java and the prior fall of Singapore had made the
passage from Australia to India altogether too hazardous. The first
convoy from the United States for India-carrying the Headquarters
and Headquarters Squadron of the Tenth Air Force, the ground
echelon of the 23d Pursuit Group, the 3d Air Depot Group, and
personnel of the I st Ferrying Group-was dispatched promptly enough
on 1 9 March from Charleston, South Carolina. But with calls along
the way at Puerto Rico, at Freetown, and at Capetown and Port
Elizabeth in South Africa, this convoy would not reach India until
m i d - M a ~ . ' ~
Fighter planes, meantime, had been shipped by water to the west
coast of Africa for delivery by ferry to India. The first of them began
to come into Karachi in April, but losses in transit were heavy and
the planes themselves were destined ultimately for China." As for
the sorely needed bombers, production was as yet unequal to the
urgent demands of the several theaters, the expanding training pro-
gram, the Navy, and our allies. Moreover, the ferry route across
the Atlantic and Africa, still imperfectly developed and incompletely
manned, exacted its toll of delay and loss en route." There was an
additional factor of misunderstanding between Washington and the
theater, attributable to the inadequacy of communications and the
unavoidable confusion which marked the first months of war, as to
the number of planes actually on hand in India. Thus, War Depart-
ment records indicated in mid-March that eighty P-4oE's had been
delivered by the Australian convoy, and that nineteen B- I 7's had been
reassigned from Java to India. It appeared, then, that the Tenth Air
Force possessed in the ~ 1 s ta full pursuit group and with the 7th the
equivalent almost of one equipped heavy bombardment group, when
actually there were only ten p-40'~and the B-17's were for the most
part strung along the ferry route awaiting repairs or spare parts.
* See above, pp. 339-40.
494