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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to “sweep the Germans from the sky…
  • p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with the ambitious idens of air power which…
  • p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was never equipped during…
  • p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are you in the Army or the Corps…
  • p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
  • p. 69 …But one axiom, with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never- theless left an open question as to how…
  • p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300 aircraft a month. The pattern of…
  • p. 122 …the German Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in the…
  • p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French factories, the force had never been employed in a…
  • p. 140 …into a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands of our own forces…
  • p. 150 …Long-term needs of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities never…
  • p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
  • p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
  • p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never- theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
  • p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
  • p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points have never been satisfactorily explained. T h e general pattern…
  • p. 277 …motors, sole- noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit- less search…
  • p. 288 …planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the accepted grand…
  • p. 303 …the principal features of the plan were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
  • p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
  • p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
  • p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
  • p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
  • p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
  • p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
  • p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been accomplished, yet now it…
  • p. 509 …Island, in the Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May the two…
  • p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the aircrews, for on the operational level…
  • p. 524 …handicaps under which AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
  • p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that proper observance of economy of force would never…
  • p. 531 …Crews which had previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these weapons into…
  • p. 544 …But the Japanese never at any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
  • p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into All told, the record…
  • p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com- mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
  • p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
  • p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
  • p. 614 …that reason deserving a high priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
  • p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign- ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
  • p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
  • p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England, nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
  • p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never before equaled by the military forces of two…
  • p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
during that movement, and to provide after the fall of Burma the
nucleus of an American air unit that would fight on in China.
The planes in their operations followed closely, however, precon-
ceived tactical patterns. Using a two-ship element in hit-and-run tac-
tics, the pilots extracted the fullest advantage from the superior diving
and level-flight speed of the P-~oB,while nullifying the enemy
fighter’s superiority in maneuverability and rate of climb by avoiding
dogfights. Against his bombers they also used a diving attack, fre-
quently coming out of the dive to strike the bomber from below. The
ruggedness of the P-40 and its superior firepower, together with an
emphasis on accurate gunnery, constant reliance on the two-plane
element, and the valiant work of ground crews enabled the “Flying
Tigers” to destroy an almost incredible number of the more fragile
Japanese planes while sustaining minimum losses. Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A V G contingents in Burma by sending an overwhelming fighter
escort with his bombers, the air discipline of the American pilots
held and kept down their losses. More serious losses were sustained
in strafing attacks on the airfields they used, but the Volunteers to the
last managed to keep a few planes in condition and offered at least
a token resistance to almost every enemy attack. By the end of Feb-
ruary, however, Rangoon had become a shambles, and during the
first week in March the A V G pilots withdrew to Magwe. Following
a heavy enemy attack on Magwe, they retreated over the China
border to a forward base at Loiwing, where the Central Aircraft
plant had been converted into an overhaul depot.17 By the close of
April the campaign for Burma was approaching its end, and the
squadron was forced back to Kunming, where it joined the remainder
of the group.
The Burma Road was now useless, and Chennault, who had been
recalled to active duty in April and promoted to brigadier general,
sent part of his force east to Kweilin and Hengyang. This deploy-
ment promised better protection for the exposed cities of unoccupied
China, and a fuller opportunity for activity against Japanese air
forces. The A V G for all practical purposes had long since become
a part of the armed forces of the United States, and plans had been
made for its incorporation into the AAF. But the A V G was a volun-
teer group in fact as well as name; many of its personnel had no
former identification with the AAF, and upon the dissolution of the
490

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